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Recently, however, a broad coalition of public figures, scholars, advocates,
courts, and philanthropic foundations have begun to push for the establishment
of a public defender system for poor immigrants facing deportation. Yet the
national debate about appointing defense counsel for immigrants has proceeded
with limited information regarding how many immigrants currently obtain
attorneys and the efficacy and efficiency of such representation.
This Article presents the results of the first national study of access to
counsel in United States immigration courts. Drawing on data from over 1.2
million deportation cases decided between 2007 and 2012, we find that only
37% of all immigrants, and a mere 14% of detained immigrants, secured
representation. Only 2% of immigrants obtained pro bono representation from
nonprofit organizations, law school clinics, or large law firm volunteer
programs. Barriers to representation were particularly severe in immigration
courts located in rural areas and small cities, where almost one-third of
detained cases were adjudicated. Moreover, we find that immigrants with
attorneys fared far better: among similarly situated removal respondents, the
odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with representation, as
compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half times greater that
they obtained relief from removal. In addition, we show that involvement of
counsel was associated with certain gains in court efficiency: represented
respondents brought fewer unmeritorious claims, were more likely to be released
from custody, and, once released, were more likely to appear at their future
deportation hearings. This research provides an essential data-driven
understanding of immigration representation that should inform discussions of
expanding access to counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been the case that immigrants have a right to counsel in
immigration court, but not at the expense of the government.1 In recent
years, advocates, bar organizations, scholars, public figures, and foundations
have begun to push for the establishment of a national public defender
system to appoint counsel for at least some poor immigrants facing
deportation.2 Following a landmark decision in the Ninth Circuit,3
immigration judges now appoint counsel for detainees with serious mental
impairments.4 A nationwide class action lawsuit alleges that the federal
1 Although there is a right to be represented by counsel in immigration proceedings, the
expense of counsel is borne by the respondent. See Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) [hereinafter I.N.A.] (“[T]he alien shall have the
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d
549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]liens have a due process right to obtain counsel of their choice at
their own expense.” (citation omitted)).
2 For a discussion of the key debates in establishing a Gideon-type right to public defense for
immigration courts, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013).
3 Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
4 In response to the Franco-Gonzalez decision, the government unveiled a new nationwide
policy to appoint counsel for immigrants with serious mental disabilities. Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce
Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or
Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21/safeguardsunrepresented-immigration-detainees.pdf [http://perma.cc/HR36-3HET].
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government is legally required to appoint counsel for all children in removal
proceedings.5 Prominent judges,6 politicians,7 and bar association leaders8
have called for systematic attention to providing representation for
immigrants facing deportation. Government and philanthropic donors
established the first-ever program to provide appointed counsel for detained
immigrants in New York City,9 and an innovative pro bono effort provided
universal volunteer representation for women and children held in a remote
detention facility in Artesia, New Mexico.10
5 Complaint—Class Action at 23-24, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 2:14-cv-01026 (W.D. Wash. July
9, 2014). In September 2014, the Department of Justice, together with the Corporation for
National and Community Service, announced $1.8 million in funding to provide approximately 100
lawyers and paralegals to represent children in immigration proceedings. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Justice Department and CNCS Announce $1.8 Million in Grants to Enhance
Immigration Court Proceedings and Provide Legal Assistance to Unaccompanied Children (Sept.
12, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-cncs-announce-18-million-grantsenhance-immigration-court-proceedings [http://perma.cc/FDY6-3WD2].
6 Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the Second Circuit has led the movement from the
bench, convening a “Study Group on Immigrant Representation” in New York and spearheading
various other initiatives. See Robert A. Katzmann, When Legal Representation is Deficient: The
Challenge of Immigration Cases for the Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 37 (2014).
7 For example, in 2014, the Attorney General of Washington called for “the federal government
to ensure every child who faces deportation has an attorney by his or her side in order to receive a fair
hearing.” Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att. Gen., Attorney General Takes Action to
Support Legal Representation for Children in Deportation Hearings (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.atg.
wa.gov/news/news-releases/attorney-general-takes-action-support-legal-representation-children-de
portation [http://perma.cc/V85E-3WCU]. A bill passed by the United States Senate in 2013 to
reform the immigration system, the “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act,” also included a provision that required counsel to be appointed for
unaccompanied children, mentally disabled, and other vulnerable groups of detainees. S. 744, 113th.
Cong. § 3502(c) (2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s744is/pdf/BILLS-113s744is.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QYA8-G7LS].
8 The American Bar Association recently passed a resolution advocating that “[c]ounsel should be
appointed for unaccompanied children at government expense at all stages of the immigration process
. . . .” ABA, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 113 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2015mm_hodres/113.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HWF-6FM3].
9 This city-funded program, known as the “New York Immigrant Family Unity Project,” is
the first program in the nation to provide universal court-appointed deportation defense counsel
in detained cases. See Our Work: New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, BRONX DEFENDERS,
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project [http://perma.
cc/3PGU-GHQY] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (describing the pilot program in New York City to
provide institutional public defenders in immigration detention).
10 For a dynamic discussion of the pro bono model used in Artesia, New Mexico, see Stephen
Manning, Ending Artesia, INNOVATION L. LAB (Jan. 2015), https://innovationlawlab.org/theartesia-report [https://perma.cc/SVT9-JJN7] [hereinafter Ending Artesia]. In November 2014, the
government abruptly announced it would close the Artesia Detention Facility and transfer the
women and children held there to detention facilities in Texas. Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of
America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2015 (Magazine), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html [http://perma.cc/
BFG5-XTZA]. A similar pro bono model now operates to assist women and children held at Texas
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Advocates favoring government funding of immigration counsel rely on
claims that too many immigrants are forced to go before immigration judges
without counsel and that unrepresented litigants fare worse than do those
with attorneys.11 Other arguments in support of providing counsel reflect
the belief that attorneys can reduce the strain on overworked judges by
helping to resolve cases more quickly.12 Yet, on a national level, there is
limited factual information available to support these assumptions.
Although the federal government publishes a yearly statistical review, such
reports focus on the immigration court’s caseload rather than on a detailed
analysis of attorney representation.13 Prior efforts to study representation in
immigration court, while extremely valuable, rely on data samples of limited
size and scope, such as cases decided in one city,14 cases raising certain types
detention facilities in Dilley and Karnes City. See CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, AM.
IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (June 29, 2015), http://www.aila.org/practice/pro-bono/find-youropportunity/cara-family-detention-pro-bono-project [http://perma.cc/D2VE-NP58] [hereinafter
CARA Pro Bono Project] (describing the purpose and operation of a program that provides pro
bono legal services directly to detained women and children).
11 See, e.g., STUDY GROUP ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A
MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1
(Dec. 2012), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_ReportII.pdf [http://perma.cc/
7JTN-P49R] [hereinafter N.Y. STUDY REPORT] (describing an “acute shortage of qualified attorneys
willing and able to represent indigent immigrants facing deportation” and noting that “the impact of
having counsel [on case outcomes] cannot be overstated”); Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for
Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT, Apr. 2005, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q85Q-F8TB] (arguing that an appointed counsel system for immigrants is necessary
given that the lack of counsel has a pronounced, negative impact on case outcomes).
12 See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon:
Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel, 39 HUM. RTS. 14, 16 (2013) (“Advocates have also
shown that speedy appointment of counsel can save substantial detention costs if detained
immigrants have qualified lawyers to promptly assess their claims.”); M. Margaret McKeown &
Allegra McLeod, The Counsel Conundrum: Effective Representation in Immigration Proceedings, (“At
every stage of immigration proceedings, as in other areas of litigation and adjudication, the
presence of competent counsel improves the efficiency of case processing and the administration
of justice.”) in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 286, 289 (Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al. eds., 2009).
13 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/04/
fy12syb.pdf [http://perma.cc/TF2P-HENZ] [hereinafter 2012 YEARBOOK] (providing statistics on
immigration courts’ caseloads in fiscal year 2012).
14 See, e.g., N. CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED
IMMIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 15-16 (Oct. 2014), https://media.law.stanford.edu/
organizations/clinics/immigrant-rights-clinic/11-4-14-Access-to-Justice-Report-FINAL.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/L8GJ-8ZAT] [hereinafter REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA] (analyzing
8992 cases decided by the San Francisco immigration court between March 1, 2013 and February 28,
2014); Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, New York Immigrant Representation Study
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of claims,15 or cases from select immigration courts.16 As courts and
policymakers explore models for creating a public defender corps for
immigration courts, it is crucial to bring data to bear in order to understand
the role attorneys currently play on a national scale.17
This Article presents the results of the first national study of the scope
and impact of attorney representation in United States immigration courts.
Our study is based on an independent analysis of over 1.2 million
immigration removal cases decided during the six-year period between 2007
and 2012.18 This extensive dataset was obtained from the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR), the division of the Department of Justice
that conducts immigration court proceedings.19 Our analysis of these court
cases was informed by our study of court rules and procedures and review of
government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information
Act.20 In addition, qualitative research provided an on-the-ground
understanding of the data we analyzed.21 This investigation included
Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 362 (2011) [hereinafter New York Immigrant
Representation] (analyzing 71,767 cases with at least one hearing in New York immigration courts
between October 1, 2005 and July 13, 2010).
15 See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
STAN. L. REV. 295, 296, 394-96 (2007) (studying over 140,000 decisions of immigration judges in
nondetained, non-Mexican asylum cases decided between January 2000 and August 2004).
16 See, e.g., NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM:
EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at 78, 81
(2008), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_evalution_updated_5-2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/94HU-8YYN] [hereinafter VERA EVALUATION] (analyzing 44,054 cases that
began between January 1, 2006 and August 31, 2006 in detained immigration courts, focusing on those
cases that received Legal Orientation Program services funded by the Department of Justice).
17 As economist John Montgomery explained in a recent attempt to quantify the cost of a
national immigration public defender system, “information and data on legal representation in
immigration proceedings is incomplete.” DR. JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, COST OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL
PROVIDING PUBLIC COUNSEL TO INDIGENT PERSONS SUBJECT TO IMMIGRATION REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS 2 (May 28, 2014), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/
NERA_Immigration_Report_5.28.2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/K57F-NPE2].
18 The complete Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) administrative database
that we obtained included 6,165,128 individual immigration proceedings that span fiscal years 1951
to 2013. Following the procedures discussed in more detail in Part B of the Appendix, these data
were reduced to an analytical sample of 1,206,633 individual deportation cases in which
immigration judges reached a decision on the merits between fiscal years 2007 and 2012.
19 As explained in the Appendix, this administrative database was obtained from EOIR—
using the Freedom of Information Act—by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC), a data-gathering and research nonprofit organization at Syracuse University. We gained
access to these data through our academic appointments as TRAC Fellows. List of TRAC Fellows,
TRAC FELLOWS (2015), http://trac.syr.edu/fellows.html [http://perma.cc/JH7J-69DB].
20 See infra Appendix.
21 Mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches can produce a better understanding of
many research problems. See JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. P LANO CLARK, DESIGNING

2015]

A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court

7

attending court sessions at six of the highest-volume immigration courts,22
observations of the know-your-rights programs provided to detained
respondents in these courts,23 and interviews with representatives of the
National Association of Immigration Judges24 and attorneys representing
immigrants in removal proceedings around the country.25
Our study provides empirically based answers to the key questions
regarding immigration representation that judges, advocates, and
policymakers are asking. While many of these answers confirm the
intuitions of those most familiar with immigration courts, others counter
the conventional wisdom regarding the availability of counsel. Part I begins
by providing a principled statistical analysis of what it means to be
“represented” by counsel in immigration court. By looking at individual
removal cases decided on the merits, we find that only 37% of immigrants
had counsel during our study period from 2007 to 2012.26 Importantly, this
percentage is lower than what is reported in government publications that
do not rely on the proportion of cases with representation, but rather rely
on the proportion of court proceedings with representation. Our research
reveals that represented cases are more likely to have multiple proceedings
in a single case and, therefore, a proceeding-based measurement technique
artificially inflates representation rates.27
Our research also counters the standard narrative that the supply of
counsel is increasing as a result of expanded pro bono legal services. We
CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS RESEARCH 12-15 (2d ed. 2011) (arguing that mixed
methods research can alleviate the weaknesses in both qualitative and quantitative research).
22 These court observations were conducted in the following immigration court jurisdictions:
Chicago, Ill.; Elizabeth, N.J.; Houston, Tex.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Newark, N.J.; and San Antonio, Tex.
23 These nonprofit know-your-rights information sessions were attended at the following
detention locations: Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, N.J.; Houston Contract
Detention Facility in Houston, Tex.; South Texas Detention Facility in Pearsall, Tex.; Kenosha
County Detention Center in Kenosha, Wis.; and Essex County Jail in Essex, N.J.
24 See FAQ’s, NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES, http://naij-usa.org/faqs
[http://perma.cc/7E7E-XXEW] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (“In 1979, the NAIJ was designated as
the recognized representative for collective bargaining for all U.S. Immigration Judges.”).
25 These semi-structured interviews were conducted with the informed consent of
participants pursuant to a protocol approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board.
26 This measurement counts as represented all removal respondents who had counsel at some
point prior to the judge’s decision on the merits. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 56, app. 3 at 125 (June 7, 2012),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-in-ImmigrationRemoval-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QQL-YYMZ] (using a proceeding-based
approach to conclude that 51% of immigrants in immigration courts had counsel in fiscal year 2011); 2012
YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at G1 (using a proceeding-based approach to conclude that 56% of immigrants
had representation in fiscal year 2012).
AND
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show that the gradual increase in representation rate that occurred during
the study period captures a decline in completed case volume, not an
increase in the number of immigrants who actually received
representation.28 Moreover, we find that only 2% of immigrants facing
removal secured pro bono representation from large law firms, nonprofits,
or law school clinics. The lion’s share of immigrant representation—90%
during the six-year study period—was provided by solo or small firm
practitioners.29 Finally, discussions of attorney representation often assume
that representation is necessarily complete, but we find that only 45% of
immigrants we count as “represented” had an attorney appear at all of their
court hearings.30
Part II builds on these baseline descriptions of representation in United
States immigration courts to uncover stark inequality in the distribution of
limited attorney resources. Representation rates differed markedly along
key axes, including detention status, geographic location of the court, and
the nationality of the respondent. Across the six-year period studied,
detained respondents went without counsel 86% of the time.31 Revealing
wide geographic disparities in representation, we find that almost 90% of
nondetained immigrants in New York City secured counsel, compared to
only .002% of detained respondents in Tucson, Arizona.32 Immigrants with
court hearings in large cities had representation rates more than four times
greater than those with hearings in small cities or rural locations.33
Immigrants from Mexico had the lowest representation rate of any major
nationality group in our study, with only 21% represented in court.34
Part III investigates two commonly asked questions in the debate over
the potential creation of a national system for immigrant representation—the
first focuses on efficacy and the second on efficiency.35 First, is providing
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

See infra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
See infra Figure 3 and accompanying text.
See infra Figure 6 and accompanying text.
See infra Figures 10a & 10b and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Figure 12 and accompanying text.
For further development of these two guiding concepts of efficacy and efficiency, as well as
a third important concept of equality, see Eagly, supra note 2, at 2306-13 (exploring these “three
somewhat competing goals that have influenced the current system of indigent criminal defense”).
See also AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE I MMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1-59 to 1-73 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckda
m.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3BF-8XVM] (summarizing key issues in immigration adjudication,
including fairness, court efficiency, and access to counsel).
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lawyers for immigrants associated with more immigrants seeking relief from
removal and obtaining successful outcomes in their cases? Second,
regardless of case outcome, do lawyers grease the wheels of justice, enabling
courts to get their work done in less time?
With respect to the efficacy of representation, we find that immigrants
who are represented by counsel do fare better at every stage of the court
process—that is, their cases are more likely to be terminated, they are more
likely to seek relief, and they are more likely to obtain the relief they seek.36
For example, detained immigrants with counsel obtained a successful outcome
(i.e., case termination or relief) in 21% of cases, ten-and-a-half times greater
than the 2% rate for their pro se counterparts.37 Success rates were even
higher among immigrants represented by nonprofit organizations, large law
firms, or law school clinics.38 Moreover, the relationship between
representation and successful cases was statistically significant and persisted
when controlling for other variables that could affect case outcomes, including
detention status, nationality, prosecutorial charge type, fiscal year of decision,
and jurisdiction of the immigration court. Among similarly situated
respondents, the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with
representation, as compared to those without, sought relief and five-and-ahalf times greater that they obtained relief from removal.39
We also document certain court inefficiencies associated with the lack of
representation in immigration courts. When immigrants are detained,
lengthy judicial processes are costly not just for the courts, but also for
detention officials who must pay for the immigrants’ housing costs during
the pendency of the case. We find that among detained immigrants who
sought counsel, almost 51% of all court adjudication time was incurred due
to time requested to find an attorney.40 Yet the majority of these detained
immigrants never found counsel.41 Additionally, those immigrants who were
represented by counsel were more likely than their pro se counterparts to
have custody hearings and be released from detention, which further saves
detention costs.42 Also, once released, represented immigrants were
36
37

For a discussion of these terms, see infra Parts I & III.
See infra Figure 14 and accompanying text. Similarly, never-detained immigrants with
counsel obtained a successful outcome in 60% of cases, three-and-a-half times greater than the 17%
for their unrepresented counterparts. Id.
38 See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.
39 This finding is statistically significant at the p < .001 level, which means that the
probability of this result occurring by chance is less than one in 1000. Results of this regression are
displayed in Table 4, infra.
40 See infra Figure 16 and accompanying text.
41 See infra Figure 8 and accompanying text.
42 See infra Figure 19 and accompanying text.
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considerably more likely to appear in court: only 7% of nondetained
represented immigrants were removed in absentia, compared to 68% of pro
se nondetained respondents.43
While we do show robust, statistically significant correlations between
representation and various case outcomes, we do not argue that
representation causes the gains that we describe in this Article.44 Our
investigation into the role of counsel in immigration courts is an
observational study, based on hearing data, interviews, and court
observations. As such, our project is a descriptive one, designed to reveal for
the first time how the presence of counsel is associated with a range of
adjudication issues of intense interest to policymakers, including the use of
immigration detention, the geographic location of immigration courts, case
adjudication times, and patterns in claimmaking and grants of relief.
In many respects, this study confirms beliefs of those who are familiar
with the immigration system: attorneys are scarce and their involvement is
linked to asserting a winning defense and helping courts to do their work
efficiently. Beyond such insights, this Article also contributes an evidencebased understanding of the severity of the gaps in immigration
representation and the complexities of the relationships among
representation, deportation, and courts. As we develop further throughout
this Article, these findings have immediate implications for the ongoing
debate regarding expanding access to counsel for poor immigrants in
removal proceedings.
I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL IN
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURTS?
Before continuing, it is useful to provide basic information regarding the
trial-level immigration courts that are the subject of our study. The nation’s
immigration courts are divided into sixty jurisdictions,45 known as “base
43
44

See infra Figure 20 and accompanying text.
Indeed, as we discuss in Section III.A, causal claims in this context would be problematic
because attorneys are not randomly assigned to immigrants facing deportation. Instead, the
immigrants decide whether they want to—and can afford to—pursue obtaining counsel, and the
attorneys decide whether to take their cases. In the process, it is possible that only certain types of
clients and cases get counsel, resulting in selection bias. James Greiner and Cassandra Pattanayak
have referred to these methodological challenges facing observational studies as “client-induced”
and “lawyer-induced” selection effects. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak,
Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use)
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2191-96 (2012).
45 See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
sibpages/ICadr.htm [http://perma.cc/B4AH-2RJA] (last updated Aug. 2015) (indexing United
States immigration courts by state).
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cities.” The judges that preside over immigration cases are administrative
law judges appointed by the Attorney General and serve as employees of
the Department of Justice’s EOIR.46 They are not part of the federal
judiciary and do not enjoy tenure like Article III judges.47
This Article analyzes cases categorized as “removal proceedings,” the
largest category of immigration decisions. Specifically, we focus on the
1,206,633 removal cases decided on the merits by approximately 377
different immigration judges during the six-year period from 2007 to 2012.48
Since 1997, the term “removal” has referred to the immigration judge’s
decision whether an immigrant attempting to enter the United States may
remain, or whether one already in the United States must be deported.49
It is helpful to clarify what is not included in this study. First, our study
excludes immigration enforcement decisions that are not made by
immigration judges.50 Indeed, a majority of immigrants removed from the
country between 2007 and 2012 never saw an immigration judge.51 Instead,
they were deported based on administrative procedures such as “expedited
removal”52 or “reinstatement of removal.”53 These types of summary
expulsion procedures that deny immigrants judicial review of the merits of

46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012) (defining “immigration judge” as an attorney appointed by
the Attorney General to serve as an “administrative judge” within EOIR).
47 For an argument that immigration courts ought to be moved out of the Department of
Justice and made into Article I courts, see Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress
Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL., Jan. 1, 2008, at 3.
48 A more detailed description of the data sample is contained in the Appendix.
49 Prior to 1996, “exclusion” was the term used for arriving immigrants and “deportation” was
used for those who were already present in the United States. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1994),
with Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012)).
50 See generally Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem,
23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 611-32 (2009) (summarizing the methods, aside from removal
hearings, that the government uses to deport noncitizens).
51 According to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statistics, only 229,968 of the
419,384 noncitizens (55%) removed from the United States in 2012 saw an immigration judge.
JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 6 tbl.7, 7 tbl.9 (Dec. 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/2MME-B2DV].
52 Under the procedure known as “expedited removal,” persons apprehended at a port of
entry (including airports, sea ports, and land border crossings) can be removed within two weeks
of entry without the right to see an immigration judge. I.N.A. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877,
48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004) (authorizing the DHS to place a designated class of immigrants in
expedited removal proceedings).
53 “Reinstatement of removal” allows a prior removal order to be activated to again remove
the immigrant, without a right to judicial review. I.N.A. § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012).

12

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1

their cases are not considered in this Article.54 Second, our study only
examines removal proceedings, which account for 97% of immigration court
proceedings.55 Other proceeding types, including credible fear, reasonable
fear, and rescission, are not analyzed.56 Finally, although immigration decisions
may be appealed, our focus is exclusively on representation at the trial level.57
Our research is guided by earlier pioneering studies of immigration
courts. The first work in this area was performed by government and
academic researchers who examined attorney representation in asylum cases
and found that asylum petitioners were much more likely to win their cases
when represented by counsel.58 Research published by the Vera Institute for
54 For timely discussions of the growth in these types of “summary” or “speedy”
administrative removal procedures, see generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed
Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2014); Removal Without Recourse:
The Growth of Summary Deportations from the United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/removal-without-recourse-growth-summary-deport
ations-united-states [http://perma.cc/FAD3-U37P]. For an excellent discussion of barriers to
accessing counsel in these summary proceedings, see AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION
CTR. & PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: AN
OVERVIEW OF DHS RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL (May 2012), http://www.legalaction
center.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Behind_Closed_Doors_5-31-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z62V-GXDF].
55 See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at C3 tbl.3 (classifying 310,455 out of the 317,930
proceedings received by the immigration courts in 2012 as “removal”).
56 Other proceeding types include asylum only, continued detention review, Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), and withholding only. Id. at C2-C3.
57 Immigration judge decisions may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
a panel composed of fifteen Board Members. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2015). Some cases may also
be appealed to federal court. I.N.A. § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2012). See generally David
Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (providing
an insightful analysis of how immigration appellate review fails to promote uniformity in outcomes
and presenting compelling policy suggestions for reform); Michael Kagan et al., Buying Time? False
Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679 (2014) (relying on empirical evidence to
support policy reform for more liberal grants of stays of removal pending appeal).
58 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND
JUDGES 30 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf [http://perma.cc/CZ2B-268P]
[hereinafter GAO ASYLUM REPORT] (“Representation generally doubled the likelihood of
affirmative and defensive cases being granted asylum . . . .”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 15, at
340 (reporting that “[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost
three times as high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel”); Andrew I. Schoenholtz
& Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 73940 (2002) (concluding that “[r]epresented asylum cases are four to six times more likely to succeed
than pro se ones”); Immigration Judges, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (July
31, 2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 [http://perma.cc/H669-PQSD] (finding that
64% of represented asylum cases were denied, compared to 93.4% of pro se asylum petitioners).
Donald Kerwin’s 2004 essay reported similar divergences in win rates for represented versus pro se
respondents for asylum, in addition to four other forms of relief. See Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal
Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, No. 04-6 (June 2004), at 1.
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Justice in 2008 on the Department of Justice’s “Legal Orientation Program”
stood out as the first attempt to examine the relationship between the
provision of know-your-rights legal orientation and adjudication times in
detained immigration cases.59 More recently, the Vera Institute partnered
with local attorneys and scholars to author a pair of case studies of attorney
representation in immigration courts in two cities—New York City and San
Francisco. These studies reveal local disparities in detained and nondetained
representation rates,60 as well as a correlation between representation by
counsel and successful case outcomes.61
Our project builds on this earlier research, while drawing on a national
administrative database that offers novel possibilities for in-depth analysis.
First, the sheer size of the sample examined in this Article makes it the
largest academic study of immigration representation ever conducted.62
Second, our study is the first to systematically analyze information in EOIR’s
court records regarding the attorneys who appear in immigration court.
Careful review and coding allowed us to take into account meaningful aspects
of attorney involvement, including whether attorneys appeared in court, when
continuances were granted to seek representation, and which types of
attorney organizations provided representation in immigration courts.
A. Case-Level Representation
What does it mean to be represented by an attorney in United States
immigration courts? The answer to this question is crucial to any study of
attorney representation. To date, however, scholars have not given this
59 The Vera Institute’s work did not focus on the provision of full-service legal assistance, but
rather on participation in know-your-rights sessions. VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 48
(finding that participation in know-your-rights sessions by detained immigrants reduced case
adjudication time by an average of thirteen days).
60 The New York City case study found that nondetained immigrants were represented 79% of the
time, while detained immigrants were represented 33% of the time. New York Immigrant
Representation, supra note 14, at 368 tbl.1. The San Francisco case study results were similar: neverdetained immigrants were represented 84% of the time, whereas detained immigrants were represented
33% of the time. REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 17 fig.1. Our work
shows that these representation rates in New York and San Francisco are much higher than the national
average of only 65% for never-detained immigrants and 14% for detained immigrants. See infra Figure 5.
61 Nondetained immigrants represented by counsel in New York City were almost six times
more likely to have a successful outcome than their pro se counterparts. New York Immigrant
Representation, supra note 14, at 384 fig.7. In San Francisco, detained immigrants with counsel were
three times more likely than pro se detained litigants to succeed. REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 9. Using similar measurements in our national data, we find that
detained respondents were ten-and-a-half times more likely to succeed than their pro se counterparts,
and nondetained respondents were three-and-a-half times more likely to succeed. See infra Figure 14.
62 See supra notes 14–16 (comparing sample sizes of previous studies of EOIR data).
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threshold question much attention. Therefore, this Section begins by
addressing the importance of the method chosen to assess attorney
involvement in immigration court. It then proceeds to describe the depth
and type of immigration representation that currently exists in United
States immigration courts.
Although there is no right to appointed counsel at government
expense,63 respondents in immigration removal proceedings must be advised
of their right to be represented.64 Generally, this reading of rights occurs at
the first hearing in immigration court, known in practice as the “master
calendar hearing.”65 To assist immigrants in this process, judges are required
to distribute a list of free and low-cost legal services to immigrants who
appear before them.66 When an attorney takes on a case, he or she must file
a “Notice of Entry of Appearance” form with the immigration court, known
as the “EOIR-28,” advising the judge that the immigrant has
representation.67
63 See I.N.A. § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (“In any removal proceedings before an
immigration judge and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such
removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no
expense to the Government) by such counsel . . . as he shall choose.”). For legal arguments that
immigrants facing deportation from the United States ought to be entitled to appointed counsel,
see generally Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deportation—Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel?, 8
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289 (1975); Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent
Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1299 (2011); Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed
Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000).
64 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1) (2015).
65 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15(a) (2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/
2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7NQ-LQ6S] [hereinafter COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL] (“A respondent’s first appearance before an Immigration Judge in removal
proceedings is at a master calendar hearing.”). Federal regulations provide that the right to counsel
applies to all immigration hearings, including master calendar hearings, bond hearings, and merits
hearings. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (2015).
66 Id. § 1240.10(a)(1)-(3). See also Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 180 (3d
Cir. 2010) (finding that an immigration judge who failed to advise the respondent of the existence
of free legal services violated the respondent’s statutory right to counsel under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.10(a)(2), necessitating reversal even without a showing of prejudice). For a copy of the list
of free providers, see Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Free Legal Services Providers, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/states.htm [http://perma.cc/C2CPCF6G] (last updated July 29, 2015).
67 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(a) (2015); Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative Before
the Immigration Court, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir28.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E77K-GPLJ] (last updated July 2015). During the time period of our study, when
a representative filed an EOIR-28, he or she generally assumed the responsibility to represent the
immigrant in all of the respondent’s future proceedings before the immigration court. As a result
of EOIR regulations, immigration representatives may now enter an appearance in a custody
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The filing of the EOIR-28 form has provided the standard government
metric for statistically analyzing whether an immigrant is “represented” in
immigration court. For example, in EOIR’s annual reports, so long as the
EOIR-28 form is filed at some point during the lifetime of the litigation,
the immigrant is counted as “represented” for the entire case.68 However,
this technique has a shortcoming: the attorney may have joined the case
only after the judge decided to order the immigrant removed or, if the
immigrant applied for relief, after the judge denied the immigrant’s
application to remain lawfully in the United States. In an attempt to correct
this problem, the Vera Institute of Justice, in consultation with EOIR,
adopted a methodology for counting representation that excluded all
individuals with EOIR-28 representation forms filed after the conclusion of
the merits proceeding.69 This technique suffers from a different problem:
the EOIR database can only accommodate one date for the filing of the
EOIR-28 form, so when more than one form is filed during the life of a
case, the filing date no longer captures the date when the attorney initially
entered the case.70
To more accurately measure attorney representation, this study counts
immigrants as represented if: (1) an EOIR-28 was filed with the court prior
to the completion of the merits proceeding; or (2) an EOIR-28 form was
filed after the judge reached the decision on the merits, but an attorney
appeared in at least one hearing within the relevant merits proceeding.71
A related and more crucial issue regarding attorney representation is the
decision to assess representation at the proceeding level or, instead, at the
individual case level. A single immigration case is divided into what are known
as “proceedings.” Each proceeding contains one or more hearing. Although
many cases have only one proceeding, a more complex case may have multiple
proceedings before a judge reaches a decision on the merits. For instance, if
proceeding without assuming the responsibility to represent the immigrant through the entire
case. See infra note 86.
68 We were able to replicate EOIR’s attorney representation statistics by relying on the
EOIR-28 field as a marker of attorney representation. See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at G1
(“Prior to representing an alien before the immigration court, a representative must file a Notice
of Entry of Appearance with the court.”); see also BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27, at 57
(explaining that EOIR statistical reports “probably overstate the actual level of representation
because respondents in some proceedings coded as ‘represented’ were not represented for the
entire proceeding”).
69 See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 59 n.76, 83-84.
70 See id. at 84 (“If there is a change in representation within the same proceeding, the E-28
date and name of legal representative will be overwritten.”); see also infra note 208.
71 The number of cases with late-filed EOIR-28 forms is small (n = 35,119) and approximately
half of these cases had an attorney appear in at least one hearing during the merits proceeding (n =
17,253). For additional discussion of our coding methodology, see infra Appendix, Part A.
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the immigrant requests a change of venue in one proceeding (e.g., to be
transferred to a city closer to family), a judge does not reach the merits of the
case until the second proceeding in the new venue.
EOIR’s reporting during the period of this study was based on
proceeding-level representation.72 Yet this proceeding-level method yields
an inflated national representation rate because it counts cases with multiple
proceedings multiple times. This counting method matters because
immigrants with representation are more than twice as likely as those
without representation to have more than one proceeding.73 To avoid this
problem of over-counting represented respondents, this Article uses a caselevel method for measuring representation rates.74
By thus accounting for the point at which the attorney joined the case
and moving to a case-level approach, we find that only 37% of immigrants
were represented by counsel in cases decided during the six-year period
from 2007 to 2012.75 On a year-by-year basis, as reflected in the dashed line
in Figure 1, between 32% and 45% of immigrants were represented. This
assessment of attorney representation is as much as 13.6 percentage points
lower than one that relies on proceeding-level analysis of representation
rates, as depicted in the vertical line of Figure 1.

72 See, e.g., 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at G1 fig.9 (displaying percentage of “Court
Proceedings Completed by Representation Status”). Other researchers who rely on EOIR data
have replicated this proceeding-level method of counting representation. See, e.g., BENSON &
WHEELER, supra note 27, at 20 (relying on a proceeding-level analysis to conclude that slightly
over half the respondents in proceedings completed in 2011 had counsel).
73 Using the entire EOIR database (N = 6,165,128), 34% of cases with only one proceeding
have an EOIR-28 on file, compared to 73% of cases with more than one proceeding (p < .001, twotailed difference of proportions test).
74 Beginning in 2013, EOIR abandoned the proceeding-level method of analysis, instead
moving to an “initial case completion” method of accounting. This method reduces much of the
over-counting problem but still results in a slightly higher representation rate than our calculation
because it includes “other completions” in the representation statistic. EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE, FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2 fig.5,
C4 fig.6, F1 fig.10, (2014) [hereinafter 2013 YEARBOOK]. Other completions include
administrative closures, which are not immigration decisions on the merits, and may later be
followed by another proceeding in which the merits of the case is evaluated. See id. at C4 (“Cases
that are not decided on their merits are classified as other completions.”). According to EOIR’s
own accounting, these “other completions” constituted 17% of “initial case completions” in fiscal
year 2013. Id. at C1. For additional discussion of the treatment of administrative closures in this
Article, see infra Appendix, Part B.
75 This 37% rate for case-level representation held constant when we looked at all types of
cases decided on their merits, as depicted in Figure 1 (n = 1,225,917), as well as when we examined
only removal cases in our National Sample (n = 1,206,633). See infra Appendix, Part B.
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Figure 1: Proceeding-Level Versus Case-Level Analysis of Representation
in Immigration Court, 2007–2012 (All Proceeding Types)76

Note: “Proceeding-Level” measures the percent of all proceedings where an EOIR-28 form
was filed at some point in the case. In contrast, “Case-Level” measures the percent of all cases
where an EOIR-28 form was filed prior to the conclusion of the merits proceeding or, if an
EOIR-28 form was filed after that completion date, an attorney appeared at one or more
hearings. The greatest difference between the two is 13.6% in 2011 (shown by the vertical
short-dashed line).

Another central part of the standard story about immigration
representation is that the national rate of representation is increasing
rapidly. In our replication of EOIR’s proceeding-level statistical approach
(as shown in Figure 1), the rate of representation of immigrants increased
by thirteen percentage points from 2009 to 2012. This rise in representation
has been attributed to vigorous pro bono efforts77 and increasing
effectiveness of court-based know-your-rights programs.78
76 Figure 1 contains all cases decided by immigration judges on their merits during the time
period studied, regardless of proceeding type. All other figures in this Article contain only
removal proceedings.
77 See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the
Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 37,
55 (2006) (“There has been a remarkable growth in immigration practice not only among those
attorneys who specialize in the field, but also in the pro bono and non-profit services available to
aid the non-citizens.”).
78 For example, EOIR touts its Office of Legal Access Programs as working to “increase rates of
representation for immigrants appearing before the Immigration Courts” by, among other initiatives,
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While the rate of representation did rise during the six years studied,
what has gone relatively unnoticed is the relationship between the number
of individual removal respondents who obtained representation and the
overall volume of removal cases. Notably, as shown in Figure 2, the number
of removal cases decided by immigration judges on the merits decreased
sharply from a high of 215,451 in 2009 to a low of 169,023 in 2012. This
fluctuation in decisions reached on the merits is important to understanding
attorney representation. Contrary to the usual account of an expanding pool
of attorney representation, our analysis reveals that the number of
immigrants who obtained representation over time remained relatively flat:
in 2007, 74,955 cases decided on the merits had counsel, compared to 76,336
cases in 2012. Thus, increasing representation rates appear to be more a
matter of decreasing volume of judicial decisions, rather than increasing
involvement of attorney representatives.
Figure 2: Relationship Between Number of Represented Removal Cases and
Total Number of Removal Cases, 2007–2012

Although an accurate understanding of case-level immigrant
representation is a crucial starting point, it only begins to describe how
representation functions in practice. For immigrants with counsel, do their
“creat[ing] new incentives for attorneys and law students to accept pro bono cases.” Office of Legal
Access Programs, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-legal-access-programs [http://perma.cc/7VQ6-GTWS] (last
updated Apr. 30, 2015).
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attorneys appear at all of their court hearings? What categories of
immigration charges and claims for relief obtain representation in court?
And, what types of attorneys take on immigration cases—large firms, solo
practitioners, nonprofits, or law school clinics? The next Sections tackle
these vital questions.
B. Hearing-Level Representation
The previous Section established that 63% of removal cases had no
attorney representation by the time of the judge’s merits decision. But, for
those immigrants who did obtain representation, how often did their
attorney appear in court? Typically, the merits proceeding begins with the
initial master calendar hearing.79 More court dates may be set until the
judge reaches the final decision on the merits.80
To measure attorney courtroom involvement, we analyzed the hearinglevel characteristics of the removal cases we counted as represented (n =
447,152).81 EOIR maintains a database for every hearing scheduled in a
given case, which includes a unique EOIR attorney identification number
for counsel present at any hearing (including master calendar hearings,
custody hearings, and individual hearings). We used this coding to
determine whether attorneys in represented cases were present at their
clients’ hearings. Our findings from this analysis of attorney presence in
court are displayed in Figure 3.

79
80

COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 65, § 4.15(a).
See infra Table 7 (calculating a mean of seven court hearings in nondetained cases with
applications for relief).
81 For a description of the coding of hearing-level data, see infra Appendix, Part A.
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Figure 3: Attorney Presence at Hearings in Represented
Removal Cases, 2007–201282

Note: Among represented respondents overall, attorneys are present for an average of 70%
(SD = 34%) of total hearings.

In the previous Section, we reported that only 37% of immigrants were
represented by counsel during the six-year period of our study. However,
our hearing-level analysis reveals that our measurement of attorney
involvement in removal cases may still be over-inclusive. On average,
attorneys were recorded as present in court for 70% of the court hearings of
their represented clients. For 11% of the cases we counted as represented, no
attorney was recorded as ever appearing in court. Figure 3 provides
additional breakdowns in frequency of attorney presence in represented
removal cases.
Our analysis also enables us to identify when attorneys were most likely
to be present in court.83 We find that almost all of these missed hearings

82 Figure 3 includes all removal cases decided on the merits between 2007 and 2012, both
detained and nondetained. In measuring attorney representation in Figure 3, presence by
telephone or video counted as presence in court. Hearings not likely to have taken place (i.e.,
judicial absence, scheduling conflict, or data entry error) were excluded from the analysis. In less
than 1% of the 447,152 cases we counted as represented (n = 3813), no hearing-level data were
available. Accordingly, these cases were excluded from this analysis.
83 Earlier researchers have been frustrated by their inability, without hearing-level data, to
determine whether an immigrant only received partial representation. See, e.g., VERA
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occurred early in the court process, rather than at the trial stage. At the
initial master calendar hearing, attorneys were only recorded as present 54%
of the time. However, attorneys were almost always present when their
clients’ cases proceeded to trial. In these trials, which are known in practice
as “individual calendar hearings,”84 attorneys were recorded as present 95% of
the time.85 These patterns are also consistent with our court visits, in which
attorneys were particularly scarce at the master calendar stage.
These findings provide critical context to the meaning of representation
in immigration court. Just because an attorney eventually joins a case does
not necessarily mean that the immigrant obtained full-service
representation in every hearing.86 Although we do find that immigration
attorneys were almost always present at trial (if there was one), attorney
involvement was notably incomplete earlier in the process.
C. Case Type
For what sorts of cases do attorneys provide representation? This
Section answers this question from a number of different procedural
perspectives, including by charge type, case outcome, and client type. In so
doing, this Section introduces readers unfamiliar with immigration court to
a few technical aspects of removal proceedings.

EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 84 (“[W]e are unable in this analysis to distinguish between
representation for the bond hearing only and representation in the removal proceeding.”).
84 “Individual calendar hearings” are held when the judge determines that there is a contested
issue of law or fact. See COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 65, § 4.16(a) (“Evidentiary hearings
on contested matters are referred to as individual calendar hearings or merits hearings.”).
85 Among represented cases, 53% had an individual calendar hearing during our six-year
study period. In contrast, only 5% of pro se cases had an individual calendar hearing.
86 Ironically, immigration courts generally disfavor “limited appearances” in which attorneys
only appear for limited purposes. See, e.g., Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 384 (B.I.A.
1986) (finding that a legal representative cannot enter a limited appearance in an immigration
proceeding). However, experts have started to recommend that EOIR allow limited appearances at
least for bond hearings. See, e.g., BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27, at 66 (“EOIR should
encourage use of limited appearance in appropriate circumstances . . . .”). New EOIR regulations
will allow limited appearances for purposes of bond hearings. See Separate Representation for
Custody and Bond Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 59,499 (Oct. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
1003) (allowing attorneys to “enter an appearance in custody and bond proceedings without such
appearance constituting an entry of appearance for all of the alien’s proceedings before the
Immigration Court”).
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Figure 4: Attorney Representation in Removal Cases,
by Case Type, 2007–2012

Note: “Total Cases” is the total number of removal cases in that category. “Percent
Represented” is the percent of removal cases nationwide in that category. The dashed vertical
line is the percent of all respondents with counsel during this period (37%).

The top portion of Figure 4 analyzes six years of removal decisions by
prosecutorial charge type. Removal cases begin when the Department of
Homeland Security files a charge against the immigrant, known as the
“Notice to Appear.”87 Some Notices to Appear contain charges based on
civil violations of the immigration law, such as entry without inspection.88
Other Notices to Appear contain immigration charges based on criminal law
violations, such as the commission of an aggravated felony that renders a
lawful permanent resident deportable.89
87 Notices to Appear, also referred to as Forms I-862, may be initiated by the different
enforcement arms of DHS—Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS). Prior to the
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the
charging document was known as an Order to Show Cause.
88 See I.N.A. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (classifying certain individuals as not eligible
for admission, such as those who have “communicable disease[s] of public health significance”).
89 I.N.A. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). For an argument that the
current immigration removal system fails to engage in sufficient weighing of individual case
equities, “especially in cases that concern noncitizens who have criminal history,” see Jason A.
Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 59),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2614149 [http://perma.cc/9K6E-28QC].
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During the study period, 85% of removal cases were based on civil
immigration charges and only 15% on criminal immigration charges.90
Interestingly, we find that immigrants charged with removal based on a
criminal violation were only slightly less likely to find counsel than those
with civil charges: 35% versus 37% representation rates, respectively.
The middle portion of Figure 4 tracks representation rates through the
removal court process. In the first stage of removal, the judge decides whether
to sustain the charges contained in the government’s Notice to Appear. If the
Notice to Appear does not state a valid ground for removal, the judge must
terminate the case.91 For example, the judge will terminate the case if the
respondent is a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident not
subject to removal. For cases that are terminated, the immigrant will be
allowed to remain in the United States. We therefore count termination as a
successful outcome for the immigrant later in this Article.92
If the immigrant is found to be removable, he or she will be ordered
removed unless he or she pursues an application for relief in the second
stage of the proceeding.93 For example, an immigrant may be eligible for
asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution.94 If the judge grants
the relief application, the immigrant is allowed to remain in the United
States. If, however, the application is denied, the immigrant is required to
leave the United States.95 Finally, a noncitizen in removal proceedings may
also apply for permission to leave the United States “voluntarily” instead of
by order of the immigration judge. By obtaining what is known as voluntary
departure,96 the immigrant pays for the return trip and avoids some of the
bars to future lawful readmission.97
90 Because the government may bring multiple charges against a respondent, we categorized
each case by the most serious charge brought against the respondent. See infra Appendix, Part A.
91 See I.N.A. § 240(c)(3)(A), U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012) (requiring “clear and convincing
evidence” to find that an admitted alien is deportable); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (2015) (clarifying the
burdens of proof in removal proceedings for several classes of aliens).
92 See infra Figure 14.
93 Immigration judges have an obligation to advise respondents of the right to seek relief
from removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (2015).
94 See I.N.A. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (allowing aliens in the United States to apply for
asylum and prescribing procedures for being granted refugee status).
95 As mentioned in note 57, supra, immigrants may also appeal a denial of an application for
relief. In our National Sample, 54% of cases in which relief was denied were followed by an appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. As David Hausman’s research on immigration appeals
reveals, some of these appeals were by the immigrant, and others by the government. Immigrants
without counsel are significantly less likely to appeal. Hausman, supra note 57.
96 See I.N.A. § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (permitting an alien to leave the United States
voluntarily instead of being found deportable); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(b) (2015) (same).
97 Immigration judges are limited in their ability to offer more intermediate forms of relief,
such as a temporary deportation or probationary relief. For arguments that judges ought to be able
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As seen in the middle portion of Figure 4, 72% of immigrants who
obtained termination were represented. For unrepresented litigants, most
cases resulted in the judge sustaining the charges in the Notice to Appear
and finding the immigrant subject to removal. Figure 4 also highlights that
only 17% of the immigrants who were removed without filing any
application for relief did so with the advice of counsel. Of those seeking
relief, 86% were represented by counsel, revealing just how rare it is to
represent oneself in a relief application. An impressive 95% of immigrants
who were granted relief between 2007 and 2012 were represented by
counsel. Relief applicants who obtained voluntary departure also had high
levels of representation (88%).98
The bottom portion of Figure 4 contains statistics regarding three other
aspects of case type that are correlated with differences in access to counsel.
First, children were more likely than adults to be represented by counsel:
55% of children received representation.99 Second, cases of immigrants
undergoing removal while serving prison terms in an EOIR program known
as the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)100 were very unlikely to obtain
counsel: only 9% of IHP respondents were represented.101 Third,
immigrants who agreed to their own removal through a process known as
“stipulated removal”102 were only represented in 4% cases.103

to grant intermediate sanctions that are in proportion to the underlying misconduct, see Juliet
Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009), and Michael J. Wishnie,
Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415 (2012).
98 In Figure 4 we show voluntary departure separate from removal. However, for most
purposes in this Article voluntary departure is treated as a form of removal, because the immigrant
must leave the country. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which defines voluntary
departure as “a form of removal, not a type of relief.” 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at Q1.
99 This is compared to only 37% of adults. We investigated this finding further and found that 29%
of represented children, compared to only 6% of represented adults, obtained free representation from
nonprofit organizations, law school clinics, or large firms providing pro bono representation. We analyze
attorney types further in Sections I.D & III.A, infra. For an argument that child migrants ought to be
allowed to play a greater role in securing the lawful admission of their family members, see Stephen Lee,
Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2015) (book review).
100 The IHP implements a 1986 congressional mandate that “the Attorney General shall
begin any deportation proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction” for
noncitizens convicted of deportable offenses. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3445 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012)). See also
2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at P1 (describing the IHP as “a cooperative effort between EOIR;
DHS; and various federal, state, and municipal corrections agencies”).
101 This is compared to 38% of non-IHP removal cases.
102 Under this procedure, the judge does not need to evaluate the merits of the case, but
rather simply determines if unrepresented respondents signed the agreement voluntarily. See
I.N.A. § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2012) (directing the Attorney General to promulgate a
regulation governing stipulated removals); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2015) (“If the alien is
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In conclusion, this Section shows that attorney representation in
immigration cases is distributed almost equally across criminal and civil
cases. However, represented cases have remarkably different procedural
patterns: they are more likely to be terminated and involve applications for
relief. Finally, while juveniles have higher than average representation rates,
other vulnerable groups, such as immigrants held in prison or who stipulate
to their removal, are very unlikely to obtain representation.
D. Attorney Type
EOIR maintains a record of attorney-level characteristics for each
attorney who appears in the nation’s immigration courts. These
characteristics include attorney name, firm name, and firm address. They
also include a unique EOIR attorney identification number that is added to
the hearing-level data when that attorney appears in court.104 In total, there
were 48,305 unique attorney identification numbers in the hearings of
represented immigrants between 2007 and 2012.105 It is important to
acknowledge that these attorney identification numbers included
nonattorneys working for nonprofit organizations and certified to appear in
court as “accredited representatives.”106
unrepresented, the Immigration Judge must determine that the alien’s waiver is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.”).
103 Our research demonstrates that these stipulated removal orders are almost always secured
without the advice of counsel. Later in this Article we show that 20% of pro se respondents were
removed with a stipulated removal order during the six-year period of our study. See infra Table 1 and
accompanying text. Moreover, nonprofit organizations were the most likely among the different
attorney types to take on cases where stipulated removal orders had been signed by the respondent.
See infra Table 1 and accompanying text. For additional background on some of the issues associated
with stipulated removal orders, see Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders
of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 509-11 (2013); Removal
Without Recourse: The Growth of Summary Deportations from the United States, supra note 54.
104 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
105 Note that any given attorney may have multiple associated EOIR attorney identification
numbers. For example, an attorney may change firms or the firm name may change. Additionally,
attorneys who practice in different jurisdictions appear to be appointed a new EOIR attorney
identification number.
106 8 C.F.R. § 1292.2(a) (2015) (permitting “nonprofit religious, charitable, social service, or
similar organization[s]” to designate representatives to practice in immigration courts). We
classified any accredited representatives appearing in the data as nonprofit organization
representation (based on the name and address of the employer). As explained infra, Figure 5, just
5% of national representation was provided by nonprofit organizations, only some of which was
provided by accredited representatives. Erin Corcoran has argued that one overlooked strategy for
expanding access to immigration representation at a lower cost is funding accredited
representatives, rather than licensed attorneys. Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A
Legislative Proposal to Address the Rising Costs and Unmet Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115
W. VA. L. REV. 643 (2012). Recent research on nonlawyer representation in unemployment

26

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1

To characterize the type of attorney associated with each represented
case, we coded these unique attorney identification numbers based on the
type of organization where the attorney was employed.107 The
organizational types occurring in the EOIR data included nonprofit
organizations,108 law school clinics,109 and law firms. We then divided law
firms into three different categories: (1) solo practitioners and small firms of
10 or fewer attorneys; (2) medium firms of 11 to 100 attorneys; and (3) large
firms of more than 100 attorneys. Finally, a small number of other
organizational types were also present but not in high enough numbers for
analysis. These included government lawyers, in-house counsel, and public
defender organizations.
Our findings reveal that the lion’s share of immigration representation
was handled by small firms and solo practitioners. As displayed in Figure 5,
90% of all removal representation was provided by small firms and solo
practitioners. The remaining 10% of representation was distributed across
nonprofit organizations,110 law school clinics, medium firms, and large firms
(primarily providing pro bono representation). Another portion of
representation involved “hybrid” representation, in which an immigrant had
more than one institutional form of representation. For example, some cases
began with a small firm but later obtained nonprofit representation.111

insurance appeals suggests that while nonlawyers may be helpful in navigating common procedural
and substantive issues, they are less well equipped to advance novel legal theories or challenge
judges on disputed areas of substantive and procedural law. See Anna E. Carpenter, Alyx Mark &
Colleen F. Shanahan, Trial and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer Advocates, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
107 For additional information on our coding method, see infra Appendix, Part A.
108 Nonprofits included organizations such as Asian Law Caucus, American Friends Service
Committee, Catholic Charities, and Human Rights First.
109 Law students may appear in immigration court under the supervision of licensed
attorneys or an accredited representative. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(2) (2015). We classified law students
based on the organization type of their supervisory organization, primarily law school clinics.
110 For a comprehensive discussion of the limitations placed on legal assistance organizations
that reduce their ability to represent immigrants, see Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance
to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619 (2011).
111 We found similar representation patterns to those in Figure 5 when we analyzed detained
cases separately. For detained respondents, 88% were represented by small firms. The remaining
12% were distributed as follows: nonprofits (68%); law school clinics (6.3%); medium firms (11.4%);
large firms (5%); and hybrid representation (9.3%).
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Figure 5: Types of Attorneys in Removal Cases, 2007–2012112

Note: “Small Firms” included 10 or fewer attorneys, “Medium Firms” included 11 to 100
attorneys, and “Large Firms” included more than 100 attorneys. “Hybrid” means more than
one organization type represented the respondent.

Not only does this analysis reveal the dominant role of small and solo
practitioners in providing immigration representation, but it also
underscores the scarcity of free legal services for low-income immigrants.
Free legal services for the poor were provided by nonprofit organizations,
law school clinics, and large firms providing pro bono representation.113 Yet
these three forms of representation combined accounted for only 7% of
overall representation in immigration courts. Since only 37% of immigrants
obtained representation, just under 2% of all immigrants facing removal
during our study period obtained pro bono legal services from nonprofit
organizations, law school clinics, or large firms.

112 For purposes of conducting the analysis in Figure 5, cases with representation from public
defender organizations, in-house counsel, and government attorneys (less than .04% of cases)
were excluded.
113 Factors that lead us to categorize large firm work as pro bono include the absence of
immigration law as a practice area on the website of most of the large law firms, the presence of
organized pro bono programs within these firms, and the frequent occurrence of immigration case
transfers to these firms from nonprofit organizations within our data. For a discussion of the
growing role of institutionalized pro bono at large law firms, see Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of
Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004).
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We recognize that this is an estimate, not an exact measure of pro bono
participation. Because we classify all work of large law firms as pro bono, we
necessarily overestimate somewhat the amount of pro bono services offered
by large firms. However, we also underestimate somewhat the level of pro
bono representation because the data do not allow us to measure the extent
to which small and medium firms may be providing pro bono legal
services.114 Still, the salient point here is that pro bono legal services in
removal proceedings are extremely scarce.
We next investigated whether client characteristics and claim-seeking
patterns differed by type of representation. The results of this analysis are
displayed in Table 1. Our research reveals that the attorney types we
identify have quite different patterns in both the clients they represent and
their litigation patterns on behalf of their clients.
The right side of Table 1 highlights the differences in filing patterns of
immigration attorneys on behalf of their clients. Here, the filing patterns of
large law firms are noteworthy. The majority of removal work handled by large
law firms (62%) involved asylum cases, the greatest proportion of any
organization type.115 Large law firms were also the least likely to forgo filing an
application for relief or to seek only voluntary departure.

114 We recognize that some small firm lawyers have been leaders in pro bono representation
efforts, including the recently established CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project that provides
free legal services for women and children detained in Dilley, Texas. See CARA Pro Bono Project,
supra note 10. A study by Rebecca Sandefur estimates that 18% of lawyers nationwide perform
some sort of pro bono legal work. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and AmericanStyle Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 96 tbl.2 (2007). Among attorneys in private
practice, those employed by large law firms provide the highest number of pro bono hours.
Moreover, on average attorneys working at firms of over 100 lawyers perform more pro bono work
than attorneys at small firms. See THE ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB.
SERV. SUPPORTING JUSTICE III: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S
LAWYERS 5 (Mar. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_
public_service/ls_pb_Supporting_Justice_III_final.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/E764-3F6D].
115 Much of this pro bono work by large law firms has been facilitated by nonprofit mentoring
and training programs that pair asylum seekers with lawyers from top United States law firms. One
such model program, Human Rights First, estimates that “attorneys from firms across the nation
donate over 60,000 hours of their time annually” to Human Rights First cases. See Press Release,
Human Rights First, Human Rights First Expands Award-Winning Pro-Bono Asylum Representation
Program (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/human-rights-first-expandsaward-winning-pro-bono-asylum-representation-program [http://perma.cc/BD3P-YTX7].
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Table 1: Client Characteristics and Application Patterns in Removal
Caseloads, by Attorney Type, 2007–2012
Client Characteristics (%)

Small Firm
Medium
Firm
Large Firm
Nonprofit
Law School
Clinic
Hybrid
Pro Se

Detained
18.3
13.5

IHP
0.4
0.4

SRO
0.2
0.2

Application Patterns (%)
No App.
VD
or VD
Only Asylum
12.0
18.9
39.3
8.7
16.4
47.0

14.0
30.0
18.9

0.4
1.9
0.5

0.1
5.4
0.0

8.5
24.3
11.7

10.7
17.9
17.4

61.6
28.4
37.9

14.4
75.7

0.2
3.4

0.1
20.1

9.4
81.6

13.2
13.2

39.2
3.7

Note: Table 1 reports (by attorney type) the percent of attorney caseload that fits different client
characteristics and application patterns. “IHP” stands for Institutional Hearing Program. “SRO”
stands for Stipulated Removal Order. Analysis of application patterns is among cases that were not
terminated by the judge. “No App. or VD” signifies no application for relief or voluntary departure
was filed. “VD Only” signifies only an application for voluntary departure was filed. “Asylum”
signifies at least one application for asylum, withholding under convention against torture, or
asylum withholding. See infra Appendix, Part A.

Particularly notable is the contrast between pro se patterns in relief
seeking and that of all attorney groups. Among pro see respondents, 82%
filed no claim for relief or voluntary departure. Even more shocking, only
4% of removal respondents without counsel filed a claim for asylum.116
The left side of Table 1 highlights the differences in client characteristics
by attorney type. Here, nonprofits were distinct in that their work was
heavily focused on the most vulnerable of immigrants in removal.
Compared to all other attorney types, nonprofits had the highest proportion
of their caseloads dedicated to immigrants in detention (30%), in prison as
part of the IHP (2%), and subject to stipulated removal orders (5%).
Nonprofit attorneys explained in our interviews that they often obtained
clients through know-your-rights programs in jails and prisons and
prioritized those cases that were most unlikely to obtain private counsel.
Given these indicators of the nonprofit client base, it is perhaps not
surprising that nonprofits were the least likely of any provider type to seek
116 Sabrineh Ardalan has described the extreme barriers facing asylum-eligible respondents in
applying for relief, many of whom may not even be aware of the asylum protections available to
them. Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing an Effective Model of Holistic
Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1001, 1017 (2015).
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relief or voluntary departure on behalf of their clients: 24% of their cases
included no application for relief or voluntary departure. Nonprofit
attorneys were also the least likely of any attorney type to represent asylum
seekers: only 28% of their cases included an asylum application. This lower
level of claim-seeking among nonprofits could result from a scarcity of
nonprofit resources to pursue claims for all clients.117 It could also reflect
that there were fewer meritorious cases in their client base, which included
more detained, IHP, and stipulated removal cases.
Thus far, this Article has revealed many striking facts about the ways in
which counsel is distributed to immigrants in removal cases. During our study
period, 63% of immigrants lacked representation. Although the percentage of
individuals represented gradually increased over time, the total number of
immigrants who appeared before immigration courts with counsel remained
relatively constant. Immigrants in removal were also unlikely to seek relief
unless represented: only 14% of relief applicants did so without counsel.
Finally, the overwhelming majority of immigrants who obtained counsel were
represented by solo and small firm practitioners.
II. UNEQUAL ACCESS TO IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION
Part II builds on the foundational elements of immigration representation
introduced in Part I to tell a more nuanced story about which immigrants
receive representation. How do representation rates differ based on detention
status, court geography, or respondent nationality? The picture that emerges
is one of starkly unequal distribution of immigration representation.
A. Detention
One critical factor related to the possibility of obtaining counsel is
whether the immigrant is placed in detention.118 Over the past two decades,
immigration enforcement has become increasingly reliant on detention.119
117 In interviews with nonprofit attorneys, we learned that many nonprofits rely on pro bono
volunteers at law firms to take over their representation, particularly on meritorious asylum
claims. The prominence of these referral relationships bears out in the data: 51% of cases with
more than one attorney type (hybrid representation) included at least one nonprofit attorney (and
92% of these hybrid cases included claims for relief).
118 For an argument that due process requires appointment of counsel for detained
immigrants, see Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113 (2008).
119 For an overview of the astonishing expansion in immigration detention, see Jennifer M.
Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 621 (2014); César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346
(2014); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010).
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Federal funding allows for approximately 34,000 noncitizens to be held in
federal detention centers, jails, and prisons.120 During the study period, the
United States government spent an estimated two billion dollars per year on
immigration detention.121
Many immigrants attending court proceedings are detained without a
statutory right to release.122 For those who are eligible for release on bond
conditions, the immigration judges may hold a custody hearing if one is
requested by the respondent.123 When judges do rule on custody, they are
instructed to weigh numerous factors related to risk of flight and public
safety.124 Finally, poor immigrants often remain detained because they are
simply unable to afford the required bond amount.125
Fortunately, the EOIR data allow for analysis of the relationship
between detention status and attorney representation. Each case is classified
by one of three codes for custody status. Respondents held in custody
throughout the pendency of their cases are categorized as “detained.”
Respondents who were detained, but later released prior to the decision on
the merits, are categorized as “released.” Finally, respondents who remained
free of detention during the entire pendency of their cases are categorized
as “never detained.” In this Article, we adopt the term “nondetained” to
refer to released and never-detained respondents as a group.

120 See Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST (Oct. 13,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detention-boom/
2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html [http://perma.cc/5QN9-R9P4] (discussing
a “bed mandate” that requires ICE to keep an average of 34,000 detainees in custody).
121 H.R. REP. No. 113-91, at 40 (2013). See generally DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION
POLICY INST., I MMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY (Jan. 2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
publications/enforcementpillars.pdf, [http://perma.cc/6VCR-48ML] (tracking the tremendous
increase in federal spending on immigration enforcement).
122 See, e.g., I.N.A. § 236(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (describing the procedure for
detention of “criminal aliens”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2015) (limiting the ability of
immigration judges to “redetermine conditions of custody”).
123 Immigration judges may not determine custody status on their own motion. See Matter of
P-C-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (B.I.A. 1991) (“The regulations . . . only provide authority for
the immigration judge to redetermine custody status upon application by the respondent or his
representative.”).
124 Bonds/Custody, EXEC. O FFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T JUST ., IMMIGRATION
JUDGE BENCHBOOK, at 6-7, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/
Bond_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5TA-ZKLZ] (last updated Apr. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK] (listing factors to consider in making bond
determinations). See also In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006) (providing that
immigration judges must weigh whether the immigrant is “a threat to national security, a danger to
the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk”).
125 See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
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Analysis of representation by detention status reveals marked inequality.
Across the six-year period studied, only 14% of detained respondents were
represented, whereas 66% of the nondetained were represented. Put another
way, nondetained respondents were almost five times more likely to obtain
counsel than detained respondents. Figure 6 provides an even more detailed
picture of this disparity, breaking down representation rates year-by-year for
each of the three relevant custody statuses.
Figure 6: Detained, Released, and Never-Detained Representation
Rates for Removal Cases, 2007–2012

Note: Aggregate representation rates from 2007 to 2012 are 14% for detained respondents, 69%
for released respondents, and 65% for never-detained immigrants.

In order to further analyze access to counsel from detention, we examined
the frequency of court continuances granted to find counsel.126 Respondents
who have not yet retained a lawyer may request additional time to find
counsel.127 By looking at the adjournment codes for individual hearings that
126 When the immigration court adjourns a hearing and schedules a new hearing for a future
date, an “adjournment code” is entered. This adjournment code explains why the court granted the
continuance. See Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to Deputy
Chief Immigration Judges et al. (June 16, 2005) (obtained by authors with FOIA request #20147182) [hereinafter Adjournment Code Memo] (defining the adjournment codes used in the court’s
record keeping system).
127 See Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that an
immigration judge’s denial of a respondent’s motion for a continuance so that he could obtain
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classify the reason for continuances, we were able to identify those continuances
that were granted so the respondent could find an attorney.128
Figure 7: Removal Respondents Granted a Continuance to Seek
Representation, by Detention Status, 2007–2012

Note: Percent represents proportion of removal respondents who had at least one hearing
adjourned to seek representation during adjudication of the case. Across this time frame, 14%
of detained, 25% of never-detained, and 41% of released respondents had at least one
continuance to seek representation.

Our analysis of these continuances to seek counsel reveals that detained
immigrants were less likely than nondetained immigrants to be granted
additional time to find counsel. As shown in Figure 7, only 14% of detained
immigrants in our study were granted time to find counsel, compared to
29% of nondetained immigrants (41% for released and 25% for never
counsel violated the statutory right to counsel and necessitated reversal without a showing of
prejudice); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2015) (“The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for
continuance for good cause shown.”); Master Calendar Checklist for the Immigration Judge,
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 124, at 3, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Script_MC_Checklist.pdf [http://perma.cc/32E5-NCJ6] (instructing immigration
judges to ask the respondent if “he or she wishes a postponement to find an attorney”).
128 There are two shortcomings to our reliance on EOIR’s adjournment coding. First, the
EOIR data can only capture one adjournment code per continuance and so cannot capture if there
are multiple contributing reasons for granting a continuance. Second, although the EOIR
adjournment coding shows when a continuance to seek counsel is granted, it does not report when
such a request is denied by the judge.
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detained).129 Notably, however, the rate at which detained respondents were
granted additional time to find counsel almost doubled during our study
period, increasing from only 11% of detained cases in 2009 to 20% in 2012.
Not only were detained respondents less likely than nondetained
respondents to obtain additional time to seek counsel, they were also less
likely to find counsel when given time to do so. Overall, only 36% of
detained respondents seeking counsel actually found counsel, versus 71% of
respondents who were never detained and 65% of respondents who were
released. A detailed picture of these differences is presented in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Removal Respondents Granted a Continuance to Seek
Representation that Successfully Obtained Counsel,
by Detention Status, 2007–2012

Note: Percent represents proportion of removal respondents who had at least one hearing
adjourned to seek representation during adjudication of the case and successfully obtained
counsel. Across this time frame, 36% of detained, 71% of never-detained, and 65% of released
respondents obtained counsel after such adjournments.

As we learned in our field research, there are many reasons why it may be
harder for detained respondents to obtain representation.130 By definition,
129 For these analyses, we included all continuances granted during the merits proceeding, as
well as any continuances granted during any earlier nonmerits proceedings.
130 For a thoughtful discussion of the various impediments to obtaining counsel from
detention, see Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of
Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (2002) (discussing work by a law
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detainees are confined in prisons, jails, and federal facilities that do not allow
them to travel to attorney offices. They must rely on telephones in their
facility to call attorneys, rather than visit their offices.131 Detainees are not
able to work132 and thus face obstacles to paying for private counsel.
These disparities in representation rates may also arise because detention
makes it difficult for attorneys to provide representation. Many of the largest
detention facilities are located far away from city centers, such as in Pearsall,
Texas or Adelanto, California.133 Attorneys who provide representation often
must travel long distances to visit their clients. Once they arrive at these
remote locations, they must work under the constraints of facility rules, which
involve securing clearance to enter the facility and restrictions barring laptops
and other electronics. Attorneys we interviewed also reported long wait times
for an available attorney–client meeting room at some detention locations.
Finally, interviews revealed that some immigration attorneys are unwilling to
take on detained cases, due to factors such as the added complication of
needing to visit their clients in the detention center.134
The challenges detainees face in finding counsel are further exacerbated
by “rocket dockets” that have emerged in recent years to prioritize the cases

school clinical program to help “brave detainees locate counsel, choose to aggressively litigate
against the governmental agencies that hold total control over their well-being and freedom, [and]
avoid deportation”), and Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (2009)
(presenting a case study based on New York City’s detained immigration court).
131 Detainees are entitled to phone access to contact attorneys, although attorneys reported
breaches of this policy in our interviews. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T,
PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011, at 359, http://www.ice.
gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DC3-4EKC] (last updated
Feb. 2013) (“Detainees shall have reasonable and equitable access to reasonably priced telephone
services.”). A recent class action suit brought by the ACLU of Northern California alleges that
immigrants in detention facilities are given inadequate telephone access, which interferes with
their due process rights to a full and fair hearing. See Complaint, Lyon v. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, No. 3:13-cv-05878 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013).
132 It is true that detainees may be eligible for a “voluntary work” program in some detention
centers, but such programs pay as little as a dollar per day. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENF’T, ICE/DRO RESIDENTIAL STANDARD: HOUSEKEEPING AND VOLUNTARY WORK PROGRAM 3
(Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/family-residential/pdf/rs_housekeeping_voluntary_
work_program.pdf [http://perma.cc/5EBV-CNEU] (providing compensation of one dollar per day
under ICE’s voluntary work program).
133 See Detention Facilities Locator, U.S. IMMIG. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities [http://perma.cc/N89Q-FF8H] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015)
(providing information on each detention center).
134 See N.Y. S TUDY REPORT, supra note 11, at 15-17 (explaining that aspects of “detention
itself undermines access to counsel,” such as detention center practices that make it difficult for
counsel to meet with and represent their clients).
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of detained immigrants.135 Under these programs, as interviewees described
and we observed in our court visits, judges place detained immigrants on an
expedited time table to complete their merits proceeding.136 In part due to
the pressures placed on court dockets to process detained cases quickly,
continuances granted to detainees were an average of five times shorter than
those granted to immigrants who were never detained.137 Less time to find
counsel may also contribute to detained immigrants’ lack of success in
finding attorneys.
In summary, the distribution of counsel between detained and
nondetained cases is extremely unbalanced. During the six-year period
studied, 86% of detained immigrants were without counsel, compared to
only 34% of nondetained immigrants. The next Section analyzes another
crucial dividing line for access to counsel in immigration courts: geography.
B. Geography
The next question we analyzed was the relationship of representation to
the location where an immigrant’s case was decided. We find that
representation rates vary dramatically across different court jurisdictions. In
addition, representation rates dip sharply in rural areas and small cities, where
the supply of practicing immigration attorneys is almost nonexistent.
As a threshold matter, it is important to appreciate that the volume of
removal cases decided in United States immigration courts varies
significantly across different jurisdictions. The map in Figure 9 depicts this
uneven distribution of removal cases. The largest circles on the map
represent the immigration courts that decided 40,000 or more cases during
the study period, with smaller circles representing courts with
correspondingly fewer cases. Predictably, some cities handled a larger
number of cases than others. During the period of our study, Miami
135 In some detained courts, judges are insisting that cases on these “rocket dockets” must be
decided in sixty days or less. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (reporting findings from an empirical study of the use of televideo technology
in immigration court).
136 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 7
tbl.1 (Oct. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/e1301.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZRW6-ZSUY]
[hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT] (citing EOIR reports on “Case Completion Goals” for
FY 2010, which included a completion goal of sixty days for detained cases).
137 The average length of a continuance for immigrants who obtained a continuance to find
counsel was 24 days for detained (SD = 30); 63 days for released (SD = 79); and 119 days for never
detained (SD = 108). This calculation is based on the number of days from the adjournment to find
counsel to the next court date. We also find that the total time for all continuances to find counsel
was far less for detained immigrants than for nondetained immigrants. See infra Figure 16.
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immigration courts decided 96,201 cases, more than any other city.138 By
comparison, judges in New Orleans decided only 4073 cases, the fewest of
any city.
Figure 9: Map of United States Removal Decisions,
by City, 2007–2012139

This graphic depiction also shows that many of the highest-volume
immigration courts are located along the Southwest border and the Eastern
coast. Only three cities—Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit—handled the
majority of all cases adjudicated in the Midwest. Few of the over 1.2 million
removal cases that we analyzed occurred in the Northwest.

138 This total includes cases handled at two different Miami court locations, one that handles
nondetained cases (n = 61,494) and the other that handles detained cases (n = 34,707). New York City
detained and nondetained courts followed Miami in overall case volume, with a total of 74,618 cases.
Los Angeles ranked third, with 68,196 cases decided during the study time period.
139 Given their geographic location, the following base cities are not included in Figure 9:
Hagatna, Guam; Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands; Honolulu, Hawaii; and Guaynabo, Puerto
Rico. In addition, three United States cities with more than one immigration court “base city”
categorization were merged (Houston, Texas; Miami, Florida; and New York City, New York).
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Not only were immigration removal cases unevenly distributed among
the different court jurisdictions in the United States, but each court also had
a different rate of attorney representation. Given our earlier discussion of
the low level of representation in detained court settings, representation
rates are best understood by separately examining detained and nondetained
representation rates.
Figure 10a: Detained Representation Rates, by Volume of
Detained Cases Decided, 2007–2012

Note: “Total Cases” reports the total number of detained removal cases completed in that base
city out of 668,674 detained removal cases completed between 2007 and 2012. “Percent
Represented” reports the proportion of detained removal respondents in each category that
had representation. The dashed vertical line is the percent of detained removal respondents
with counsel across all cities (14%).

Figure 10a lists the twenty court jurisdictions that decided the highest
number of detained cases during the six-year period studied. Within these
high-volume detained jurisdictions, the proportion of immigrants
represented fluctuated by as much as twenty-two percentage points. The
highest detained representation rate of 22% was in El Paso. The lowest—a
shocking .002% over the entire six-year period of our study—occurred in
Tucson, Arizona.140 We investigated further and learned that immigration
140 Out of a detained removal population in Tucson of 17,053, only twenty-six respondents
had representation.
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judges in Tucson utilize a “quick court” in which expedited hearings are
held in Border Patrol detention stations and judges’ chambers.141 The end
result is the lowest representation rate in the country and lightning-fast
processing times (97% of detained cases in Tucson were processed in one
day).142
Figure 10b: Nondetained Representation Rates, by Volume of
Nondetained Cases Decided, 2007–2012

Note: “Total Cases” reports the total number of nondetained removal cases completed in that
base city out of 537,959 nondetained removal cases completed between 2007 and 2012.
“Percent Represented” reports the proportion of nondetained removal respondents in each
category that had representation. The dashed vertical line is the percent of nondetained
removal respondents with counsel across all cities (66%).

Similarly, as shown in Figure 10b, cities with the largest volumes of
immigration cases for nondetained immigrants also varied widely in their
141 See Lauren Gambino, The Busiest Border Patrol Sector, NEWS21, http://asu.news21.
com/2010/08/the-busiest-border-patrol-sector [http://perma.cc/7R2M-9UUR] (last visited Sept.
19, 2015) (describing the border control program in Tucson, Arizona). According to a document
obtained by the Immigration Legal Action Center through FOIA, Tucson’s “Immigration Quick
Court” has a target number of “noncontested deportation cases for Mexican citizens” to be heard
each “court day.” ASSOCIATE CHIEF, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, UNIVERSAL BORDER
ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS 2 (Oct. 15, 2010), http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/
Production%209_5-17-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/RE4B-PDYB].
142 Tucson had the highest one-day processing rate of any base city in the country during our
study period.
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representation rates. In the busiest twenty nondetained court jurisdictions,
representation rates reached as high as 87% in New York City and 78% in
San Francisco. At the low end of these twenty high-volume nondetained
jurisdictions, only 47% of immigrants in Atlanta and Kansas City secured
representation. Across all nondetained jurisdictions in the United States,
66% of respondents were represented, as depicted in the dashed vertical
line. Importantly, this nondetained representation rate is almost five times
higher than the representation rate for detained cases.143
We next explored the extent to which a court’s urban or rural location
makes a difference in representation rate. Other researchers in the field
have suggested that the location of immigration courts away from urban
centers may place downward pressure on representation rates.144 Some have
argued that this effect could be particularly large in the context of remote
detention centers, given the added time and expense that urban attorneys
incur in traveling to meet with their clients.145 Yet, to date, researchers have
not empirically analyzed the relationship between city size, detention, and
representation rate at a national level.
To address this issue, we categorized all immigration court cities based
on the city’s size.146 Cities with populations fewer than 50,000 were
categorized as small, and those with populations between 50,000 and
600,000 were categorized as medium. Finally, those with populations above
600,000 were categorized as large. Overall, we found that immigrants with
143 Naturally, representation rates also vary by judge. See Hausman, supra note 57 (describing
variations in case details and results among immigration judges). However, we find that variation
is much greater across court jurisdictions (base cities) than across the judges who sit within them.
Specifically, in contrast to the variations depicted in Figures 10a and b, we find that representation
rates among active judges who heard at least 1000 cases during our study period varied by only
plus or minus four percentage points on average (SD = 4) in active detained jurisdictions and fiveand-a-half percentage points on average (SD = 3) in nondetained jurisdictions.
144 For example, a case study of New York City immigration courts found that immigrants
who were transferred to a different court jurisdiction were less likely to obtain counsel than those
who remained in the urban New York court. See New York Immigrant Representation, supra note
14, at 363 (finding that 40% of detained immigrants who remained in New York City were
represented by counsel at the completion of their cases, as compared to 21% of those immigrants
who were transferred outside New York City and remained detained).
145 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF
IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1209webwcover.pdf [http://perma.cc/XA4M-92H6]
(documenting difficulties faced by immigrants held in remote detention centers in securing
representation); N.Y. STUDY REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (stressing that, in addition to barriers to
counsel inherent to detention centers, the fact that some detention centers are in “difficult to access
locations” that require “added time and effort of travel” could contribute to the challenges in getting
lawyers to take on detained cases).
146 For a more detailed description of our city size coding method, see infra Appendix, Part A.
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court hearings in large cities had a representation rate of 47%, more than
four times greater than the 11% representation rate of those with hearings in
small cities or rural locations.
A more detailed report of our city size analysis—broken down by custody
status—is displayed in Figure 11. Notably, both detained and nondetained
immigrants were less likely to obtain counsel when their case was decided in a
small city.147 Immigrants detained in small cities had the lowest
representation rate—only 10% across all cities of fewer than 50,000 residents.
Figure 11: Representation in Removal Cases, by City Size and
Detention Status, 2007–2012

Note: “Small City” includes base cities with populations up to 50,000; “Medium City”
includes base cities with populations of 50,000 to 600,000; and “Large City” includes base
cities with populations of 600,000 or more.

The city size analysis contained in Figure 11 also reveals that detained
cases were more likely than nondetained cases to be adjudicated in small
cities. While 219,950 detained cases were heard in small cities, only 4476
nondetained cases were heard in small cities. That is, the cases of vulnerable
detainees, who we have already established are less likely to obtain
representation, are also disproportionately concentrated in small cities. This

147

This finding is statistically significant at the p < .001 level.
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practice of locating detention centers in small cities further limits the
detainees’ chances of obtaining counsel.
The ongoing reality of placing detained immigration courts in remote
areas away from counsel has recently received more attention. In 2014,
women and children fleeing violence in Central American were brought to
Artesia, New Mexico, a town of 11,500 people, to be detained at a
Department of Homeland Security training facility.148 As immigration
attorney Stephen Manning chronicles, Artesia, New Mexico, is a physical
space “far away from public scrutiny and public access” with “[n]o lawyers,
no human rights groups, and no community based organizations.”149 We
checked our database of attorneys who appeared in the 1.2 million
immigration cases in our study and found that not even one lists an address
in Artesia, New Mexico.150
The EOIR data allowed us to more systematically probe the relationship
between the geographic location of courts and the supply of immigration
attorneys. In order to conduct this analysis, we first isolated those court
jurisdictions with at least 20,000 removals in detained or nondetained courts
between 2007 and 2012. Of these cities, the four jurisdictions with the highest
numbers of immigrants with representation were: New York City (62,432);
Los Angeles (42,040); Miami (41,602); and San Francisco (19,599). Among
cities with at least 20,000 removals, the fewest immigrants obtained
representation in the following four cities: Florence, Arizona (1901); Tacoma,
Washington (2385); Lumpkin, Georgia (2422); and Oakdale, Louisiana
(2994). These eight high- and low-representation cities are listed in Table 2.
We next analyzed the records of all individual attorneys who represented
clients during the six-year period studied in these eight immigration courts.151
In Table 2 we report astonishing variation in the number of immigration
attorneys with practices located in the same city as these high-volume courts.
Moreover, the ratio of practicing attorneys to case volume was associated with
the number of immigrants that obtained representation. Lumpkin
immigration court, which completed 42,006 removal cases during the study
period, did not have a single practicing immigration attorney in the city.
Oakdale immigration court, which completed 43,650 cases, had only four
practicing immigration attorneys in the city. Indeed, in the four high-volume
148
149
150

Ending Artesia, supra note 10, at 10.
Id. at 9-10.
The only immigration attorneys in New Mexico were in the cities of Albuquerque,
Anthony, Deming, Las Cruces, Mesilla Park, Ruidoso, and Santa Fe.
151 By pulling the identification codes, names, and address information of the attorneys that
appeared in those courts, we were able to count the number of unique attorneys who represented
clients in each city. For more on our methodology, see infra Appendix, Part A.
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base cities with the fewest represented respondents, the ratio of attorneys to
case volume ranged from zero to barely over one attorney per 1000 cases.152 In
contrast, high-volume immigration courts with a greater volume of
represented respondents had much higher representation ratios. New York,
for instance, had 27.5 attorneys for every 1000 removal cases.
Table 2: Attorney Availability in High-Volume Removal Courts with Highest
and Lowest Volume of Represented Immigrants, 2007–2012
Base City
Represented (High)
New York
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Miami
Represented (Low)
Tacoma
Florence
Oakdale
Lumpkin

Attorneys in
City

Total Case
Volume

Ratio
(per 1000 cases)

2051
1153
664
845

74,618
68,318
36,279
96,201

27.5
16.9
18.3
8.8

38
19
4
0

29,367
20,766
43,650
42,006

1.3
0.9
0.1
0.0

Note: “Attorneys in City” represents the number of immigration attorney representatives in
each base city. “Total Case Volume” represents the number of removal cases completed in the
base city. “Ratio” represents the number of attorneys in the base city per 1000 cases.

This research underscores the decisive role that geography plays in
accessing legal counsel. Removal cases are highly concentrated in those
immigration courts located along the Southwest border and the East coast.
Yet representation rates in these high-volume courts vary widely, even when
we controlled for detention status. Geography is a particularly harsh barrier
to accessing counsel for those immigrants attending court in small cities and
rural areas where few immigration attorneys practice. The placement of
approximately one-third of detained cases in these remote court locations
has only further intensified the obstacles faced by detained immigrants in
accessing counsel.
152 Researchers of civil legal assistance programs have similarly found that the availability of
attorneys and pro bono services varies widely across geographic regions. For example, as of 2010,
Louisiana only had 1.5% of the total number of active lawyers in the United States, as compared to the
13.3% located in New York. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS
AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT 67, 96
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access_across_america_
first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf [http://perma.cc/BEN9-XRHX].
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C. Nationality
The final aspect of inequality in immigration court representation that
we evaluated is nationality. Previous studies have found that immigrants
from certain countries or geographic regions have a higher likelihood of
receiving relief from removal.153 Yet no study has examined disparities in
retaining counsel by nationality.154 To explore this question, we identified
the fifteen most common respondent countries of origin alleged in United
States removal cases. Then, we determined the percent of immigrants
represented by counsel in each of these nationality groups.
The compelling results of our nationality analysis are displayed in
Figure 12. Although Mexicans were by far the largest nationality group in
removal, they were also the least likely to be represented by counsel. Only
21% of the 574,448 Mexicans who were put in removal proceedings had an
attorney. In sharp comparison, the 40,397 Chinese placed in removal
proceedings were represented in 92% of the cases.

153 See, e.g., GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 58, at 80-82 & 81 tbl.10 (finding sizable differences
in asylum grant rates based on applicant nationality for both affirmative and defensive claims).
154 Federal immigration law has a long history of giving preference to certain immigrant
groups and in discriminating along lines of race. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES (2006) (analyzing the history of immigration law and policy in the United
States). In particular, Mexicans as a group have been disproportionately criminalized and targeted
for deportation throughout United States history. See generally Nicholas De Genova, The Legal
Production of Mexican/Migrant “Illegality” (detailing the severe restrictions the United States has
placed on legal migration from Mexico), in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A
READER 160 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013); Gerald P. López,
Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV.
615 (1981) (outlining the history of deportation of Mexican nationals from the United States).
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Figure 12: Representation Rates Among Nationalities with Greatest
Number of Cases Decided, 2007–2012

This 71% spread in representation rates across nationalities could be
attributed to a number of factors. Economic status certainly plays a role, as
the scarcity of pro bono resources demands that the majority of immigrants
who obtain representation must be able to afford an attorney. The ability to
find an attorney could also be influenced by the strength of the social
networks of the different immigrant groups.155 This variation could also stem
from differences in the value placed on formal legal representation as well as
informal connections some immigrants may have to assistance short of actual
representation, such as from paralegals and “notarios.”156 Finally, immigration
law may help explain why certain nationalities are less likely to retain
attorneys, given that remedies such as asylum rely on country conditions.157
155 Since the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Chinese have had a history of
high rates of legal representation in immigration courts, in part due to very tight social networks
and extensive contacts with attorneys. See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS:
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF M ODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 37-68 (1995)
(describing how Chinese social networks developed to combat harsh immigration policies).
156 See ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., LIVES IN THE B ALANCE: ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 54-60 (2014) (discussing
the importance of community ties in obtaining representation in seeking asylum); Khalid Koser,
Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle: The Case of Iranians in the Netherlands, 31 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 591, 602-03 (1997) (analyzing the role of social networks in providing assistance to recently
arrived migrants).
157 Thank you to Professor Rebecca Sharpless for raising this point with us.
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Figure 13: Detention Rates Among Nationalities with Greatest
Number of Cases Decided, 2007–2012

As seen in Figure 13, we also find a troubling spread in detention rates
by nationality. While Figure 13 is not a perfect inverse of the representation
rates displayed in Figure 12, it does come fairly close. Chinese, who had the
highest representation rate of any nationality group (92%), were detained at
a rate of only 4%, the lowest of any major nationality group. In contrast,
Mexicans, who had the lowest representation rate of any nationality group
(21%), were subject to detention 78% of the time. These findings raise
compelling questions as to whether Mexicans and other Latinos are
disproportionately targeted for immigration detention.158 Research into
other aspects of immigration enforcement has shown that the availability of
detention and deportation can incentivize law enforcement to engage in
racial profiling of the Latino community.159
158 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 114-15), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501704
[http://perma.cc/J6XJ-JBNQ] (documenting the “racially skewed enforcement” of immigration
and criminal laws against Mexicans and other Latinos that “threaten[s] to delegitimize
immigration law”); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “PostRacial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 599 (2015) (arguing that the detention of Latinos has
“resulted in the devastation of Latinos, their families, their communities, and the countries of their
origin, thereby contributing to their inability to gain economic and political stability”).
159 See, e.g., TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING
IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (Sept. 2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf [http://perma.cc/YGK5-SVWJ] (documenting a correlation
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Up to this point we have shown that 63% of immigrants facing
deportation went without representation during our study period. As Part
II explained, there are stark inequalities in how this limited amount of
representation was distributed. Immigrants held in detention or scheduled
for hearings in rural areas and small cities were the least likely to find an
attorney. Additionally, the likelihood of securing representation varied
markedly based on the respondent’s nationality. Next, in Part III, we turn to
the central question of whether and how representation matters.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION
AND IMMIGRATION OUTCOMES
Up to this point, this Article has established that the overwhelming
majority of immigrants are forced to defend themselves during removal
proceedings. Parts I and II have also revealed stark differences in court
location, nationality, and custody status correlating with whether counsel is
accessed in United States immigration courts. Yet to what extent does
representation make a difference in deportation cases?
Advocates supporting expanded access to counsel for immigrants have
relied on two main assumptions about the difference that representation
makes. The first is that immigrants are less likely to be deported when they
are represented. The second is that cases with representation move more
swiftly through the system, thereby improving court and detention
efficiencies by resolving cases more quickly.160 No research has yet measured
the strength of these assumptions on a national scale.

between immigration enforcement in a local jail and the profiling of Latinos in Irving, Texas);
Ashar, supra note 130, at 1192-99 (describing an increase in race-based immigration enforcement that
relies on immigration detention); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 967, 96869 (2015) (arguing that the “group of noncitizens subject to removal tends to be racially skewed” and
this effect is exacerbated by “the racially disparate impacts of the criminal justice system”).
160 Some interesting research has also begun to explore how detention and deportation are
associated with other social costs. See, e.g., THE CENTER FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., THE
NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: GOOD FOR FAMILIES, GOOD FOR
EMPLOYERS, AND GOOD FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 6-14 (2013), http://populardemocracy.org/
sites/default/files/immgrant_family_unity_project_print_layout.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q2D2-UK47]
(documenting the cost of foster care and health services for children whose caregivers are detained or
deported); REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that
detention and deportation “deeply damage[s] familial relationships”); N.Y. STUDY REPORT, supra
note 11, at 14 (arguing that children who are separated from their detained parents are more likely to
experience psychological problems); Montgomery, supra note 17, at 23 exhibit 8 (calculating the cost of
foster care in cases where United States citizen children are separated from their deported parents).
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A. Efficacy
This Section turns to the central question of whether and how attorney
representation matters for immigrants facing deportation. Two caveats are
in order. First, the analysis presented here is descriptive, based on an
analysis of case files. While we do show robust, statistically significant
correlations between representation and certain outcomes, we do not argue
that representation causes the respondent success and efficiency gains that
we describe. For example, the higher success rates for relief applications
that we identify in represented cases may be due to selection effects:
attorneys may choose cases they can win.161 Cases with weak facts or harsh
law could be rejected and left unrepresented. Even attorneys offering free
legal services through a nonprofit organization or pro bono initiative may
want to be strategic and focus resources on the strongest or most
sympathetic claims. In addition, clients themselves may self-select: those
with the strongest desire to fight their cases may be precisely those who
succeed in finding attorneys.162 In the future, a controlled study in which
immigrants are randomly assigned to counsel or self-representation would
allow researchers to address some of these issues of selection bias.163
Second, our analysis of the relationship between counsel and case
outcomes does not purport to measure the experience164 or zealousness165 of
the individual attorneys handling these cases. The low quality of

161 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette (pointing out issues of selection bias in
analyzing asylum claims), in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
AND PROPOSALS FOR R EFORM, supra note 12, at 45, 75 n.33.
162 For additional discussion of issues of selection bias, see Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note
44, at 2196-98 (arguing that scholars should turn their attention away from case-file based studies
of attorney representation and instead conduct randomized studies of attorney representation).
163 Cf. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in
a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 934 (2013)
[hereinafter The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance] (concluding in a randomized study of eviction
defendants that those offered legal services by Greater Boston Legal Services fared far better than
those not offered help).
164 See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 433, 454 (1992) (reporting that out of 149 observed asylum hearings, every
successful claimant was represented by “experienced counsel”).
165 For a persuasive argument that more attention should be paid to providing zealous
representation in immigration court, see Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the
Borders in Immigration Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (2015) (arguing that higher
standards should be set for counsel appearing in immigration court), and Andrew I. Schoenholtz
& Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2008) (noting the potential for increased success rates if noncitizens were
represented by competent counsel).
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immigration lawyering is a topic of significant concern.166 A study of
immigration judges in New York found that a shocking 33% of immigration
lawyers were “inadequate” and 14% were “grossly inadequate.”167 Appellate
courts have notoriously criticized the “lack-luster” skills of many
immigration attorneys who practice in deportation courts.168 Nonetheless,
although we do not attempt to quantify attorney skill or strategic
decisionmaking, our project is the first on immigration representation to
systematically analyze case outcomes at each stage of the removal process
and in relation to the organizational type of the attorneys involved.169
1. Seeking and Obtaining Relief
Success in the immigration system is generally understood as the ability to
remain in the United States, achieved when the government’s charges are
terminated (e.g., when the Notice of Action fails to state a valid reason for
removal) or when an immigration judge grants relief from removal (e.g.,
asylum). Using termination and relief as a combined measurement of success,
we find that both detained and nondetained immigrants with counsel had
higher success rates. These higher rates are displayed in Figure 14.
Depending on custody status, representation was associated with a
nineteen to forty-three percentage point boost in rate of case success. Put
another way, detained respondents, when compared to their pro se
counterparts, were ten-and-a-half times more likely to succeed, released
respondents were five-and-a-half times more likely to succeed, and neverdetained respondents were three-and-a-half times more likely to succeed.

166 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1449, 1477, 1482 (2006) (describing one solo immigration lawyer as “taking far too many cases” and
“abandoning clients, ignoring filing deadlines, and missing hearings”).
167 New York Immigrant Representation, supra note 14, at 391.
168 See, e.g., Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 681 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, No. 14-2179 (7th Cir. July 14, 2015) (No. 41) (“There are some first-rate immigration
lawyers, especially at law schools that have clinical programs in immigration law, but on the whole
the bar that defends immigrants in deportation proceedings . . . is weak—inevitably, because most
such immigrants are impecunious and there is no government funding for their lawyers.”).
169 For an important example of a recent study that compared case results based on attorney
type—namely, public defenders versus court-appointed private attorneys—see James M. Anderson
& Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder
Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012).
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Figure 14: Successful Case Outcomes (Termination or Relief) in Removal
Cases, by Detention and Representation Status, 2007–2012170

These findings suggest that having an attorney to help navigate the
complex removal process enhances the chance of success in removal. They
could also reflect other factors, such as the reality that prevailing on a pro se
claim from detention is almost impossible and that attorneys tend to
gravitate toward claims that they can win. Moreover, respondents cannot
obtain relief unless they apply for it and, as we presented earlier, cases with
representation and those litigated outside detention are far more likely to
pursue relief.171 In order to further evaluate these patterns, we next explore
the two components of obtaining relief—the respondent’s decision to apply
for relief, followed by the judge’s decision to grant the application.

170 All differences between pro se and represented respondents are statistically significant
(p < .001, two-tailed difference of proportions test).
171 See supra Table 1 and infra Table 3. As Juliet Stumpf has eloquently pointed out, mass
immigration detention now “drives deportation” and risks “erroneous” decisions in immigration
courts. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 55 (2014).
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Figure 15: Relief Application and Grants of Relief in Removal Cases,
by Detention and Representation Status, 2007–2012

Note: This figure considers only respondents whose cases were not terminated.

These findings have implications for a national public defender system.
Although our data are merely descriptive and cannot predict what
representation for all respondents would look like, these results suggest that
universal representation would provide respondents with more avenues for
relief. In addition, it may help to deter unmeritorious applications from
being filed by pro se respondents. As Professor Philip Schrag has argued in
the context of asylum, allowing the government to fund counsel would both
“be fair to low-income asylum applicants with complex but valid cases” and
“help to deter fraudulent applicants from pressing their claims.”172
We know that attorneys are associated with success in immigration cases,
but do some types of attorneys have more success than others? The quality
of the immigration bar is often criticized as substandard,173 yet few studies
have addressed the relationship between attorney type and case outcome. In
a 2011 survey, New York City immigration judges rated pro bono counsel,
172 Philip G. Schrag, Offer Free Legal Counseling to Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/12/how-can-the-asylum-system-be-fixed/offer-fr
ee-legal-counseling-to-asylum-seekers [http://perma.cc/VZP5-P29L].
173 See Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (2011) (reporting that federal judges gave immigration
attorneys the lowest ranking for quality of any attorney type).
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law school clinics, and nonprofits as more highly skilled than private
attorneys.174 A recent report concluded that 83% of cases handled by
nonprofit organizations in Northern California had a successful outcome.175
Other empirical work in this area has focused on asylum cases. One
study found that asylum seekers represented by Georgetown University’s
clinical program were granted asylum in 89% of cases, compared to only
46% of the time in asylum cases handled by other types of attorneys.176
More recently, researchers analyzed asylum claims filed by 1234 immigration
attorneys.177 Among other findings, they concluded that pro bono attorneys
“are better than more experienced immigration attorneys” in terms of their
win rate on asylum cases.178
Our attorney-type analysis builds on these earlier findings, using a more
robust data sample that includes all types of claims for relief. Importantly,
our analysis is also staged: we first examine the rate of case terminations
and, among those cases that are not terminated, look at relief rates among
those who seek relief. This type of analysis is critical to properly
understanding what happens as respondents move through the removal
process.179 Finally, we also separate grant rates based on three different
custody statuses: detained, released, and never detained.
The results of our analysis are contained in Table 3. We find that small
and solo firms had the worst overall performance. Across each custody
status, small and solo firms had the lowest level of success attaining case
termination and relief for their clients. They were more or less on par with
other providers, however, in terms of the rate with which they sought relief.

174
175

New York Immigrant Representation, supra note 14, at 393 tbl.9.
See REPRESENTATION IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 25 (defining
successful outcome as termination or relief). The study’s authors do not specify if this statistic
includes clients who did not apply for relief.
176 Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 15, at 341 fig.29.
177 Banks Miller et al., Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of
Asymmetrical Capability, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209, 221 (2015).
178 Id. at 227. As discussed earlier, nonprofit organizations play a central role in screening,
referral, and mentoring of pro bono volunteers from law firms. See supra note 115.
179 For a critique of observational studies that misleadingly examine “only cases that reach
some kind of hearing” and exclude all cases that are resolved in other ways (such as through
settlement or dismissal), see Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 44, at 2185.
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Table 3: Case Outcomes, by Attorney Type and
Custody Status, 2007–2012
Percent
Case
Relief
Relief
If Apply
Termination
Application
Detained
Small Firm
Medium Firm
Large Firm
Nonprofit
Law School Clinic
Hybrid
Pro Se
Released
Small Firm
Medium Firm
Large Firm
Nonprofit
Law School Clinic
Hybrid
Pro Se
Never Detained
Small Firm
Medium Firm
Large Firm
Nonprofit
Law School Clinic
Hybrid
Pro Se

7
7
11
7
10
7
1

39
41
68
35
45
64
3

47
58
64
59
56
54
23

15
17
25
31
36
24
5

61
64
72
61
72
75
10

47
60
71
59
72
59
14

18
17
20
31
41
26
15

82
85
88
74
83
83
15

63
76
77
70
77
68
13

Note: “Case Termination” signifies percent of cases terminated in each category. “Relief
Application” signifies percent of nonterminated cases that applied for relief in each category.
“Relief if Apply” signifies percent of relief applications granted relief in each category.

Nonprofits enjoyed high levels of success in detained cases (7% of
detained cases were terminated, and 59% of detained cases with relief
applications were granted). However, for detained cases, large firms, which
primarily handled cases through pro bono programs, had the highest win
rates of any category of attorney (11% of detained cases were terminated,
and 64% of detained cases with relief applications were granted). As Table 3
reveals, nonprofits also did quite well in obtaining termination for released
and never-detained clients, but were less competitive in obtaining relief
than large firms, medium firms, and law school clinics.
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Law school clinical programs had the highest overall success rate of any
attorney type for relief applications on behalf of nondetained clients. For
clients released from detention, law clinics obtained termination in 36% of
their cases and won relief in 72% of the cases where they sought relief. For
clients who were never detained, law clinics obtained termination in 41% of
their cases and won relief in 77% of the cases where they sought relief.
Finally, for comparison purposes, the last row in Table 3 displays the
patterns in termination, relief applications, and grants of relief for pro se
respondents. The contrast between pro se respondents and represented
respondents is remarkable. While other research has compared pro se and
represented outcomes among certain groups of applications for relief (such
as asylum),180 our work shows that the procedural paths of pro se and
represented cases are different. At the initial stage of the removal process,
pro se cases were much more likely to have their charges sustained. Then,
after having these charges sustained, they were far less likely to pursue
relief. For instance, among detained pro se respondents, 99% had their
charges sustained and 97% never sought relief from removal.
2. Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between
Representation and Case Outcomes
To further distill the impact of attorney representation on case outcomes, in
this subsection we turn to a sequential logit regression model,181 which allows us
to take into account the two-staged procedure in immigration cases and to
control for various respondent- and case-level attributes.182 As in Parts I and II,
we limited our data sample to the approximately 1.2 million removal cases
180 For example, a recent study looks only at asylum claims in concluding that it would be
“actually better” for immigrants with low-quality attorneys to represent themselves. Miller et al.,
supra note 177, at 210. However, the study only analyzes those cases in which respondents sought one
type of relief (asylum) and ignores other types of claims as well as the crucial earlier stages in the
procedural process where termination is granted and applications for relief are filed. Our research
reveals just how rare it is that a pro se respondent files for asylum. In our National Sample, only
3.7% of pro se respondents sought asylum in the second stage of removal. See supra Table 1.
181 For additional description of this analysis, see supra Figure 4 and Sections I.B, C.
182 Other studies have similarly used a logistic regression to analyze the relationship between
counsel and case outcomes. See, e.g., GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 58, at 30
(“Representation generally doubled the likelihood of affirmative and defensive cases being granted
asylum, after we controlled for the effects of the immigration court the case was heard in; the
applicant’s nationality . . . .”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 15, at 340 (“The regression analyses
confirmed that, with all other variables in the study held constant, represented asylum seekers
were substantially more likely to win their case than those without representation.”); Emily Ryo,
Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2016) (on
file with author) (“[T]he odds of being granted bond are more than 3.5 times as high for detainees
with attorneys than those who appeared pro se.”).
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decided on their merits by immigration law judges between 2007 and 2012. To
enhance the analysis, we removed all cases of children, as well as cases of
immigrant prisoners decided in the IHP.183 Our regression analysis also
controlled for a number of other factors that could be associated with obtaining
counsel: (1) detention status; (2) nationality; and (3) prosecutorial charge
type.184 We also included fixed effects for the court jurisdiction (“base city”)
and fiscal year in which the case was decided.185
The results of our regression are displayed in Table 4. Each column
presents a different binary outcome category (e.g., obtaining counsel or
not). Our results are reported in terms of odds ratios. If the odds ratio is
higher than 1, it reveals an increase in the odds of each outcome category,
while controlling for other variables.
We first analyzed the likelihood of obtaining counsel. The first column of
Table 4, “Received Counsel,” explores differential odds of obtaining counsel for
different categories of respondents. For example, the first row in that column
reveals that the odds that nondetained respondents obtained counsel were
almost nine times higher than similarly situated detained respondents.

183
184
185

See infra Appendix, Part C.
The coding of these variables is discussed further in the Appendix, Part A.
Including fixed effects for court jurisdiction (“base city”) and year of decision helps
account for unmeasured factors that might lead to lower or higher grant rates in different courts or
across different years.
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Table 4: Logit Regressions of the Effect of Representation in
Removal Cases, 2007–2012

Counsel
Nondetained
c

Region
Central America
South America
Caribbean
Asia
Other
d

Charge
Other Criminal
e

EWI

Other Immigration
Pseudo R-Squared
No. of observations

Received
Counsel
—

Relief
a
b
Grant
Application
15.03***
5.49***
(0.11)
(0.09)
4.19***
2.17***
(0.05)
(0.04)

8.58***
(0.06)

Case
Termination
1.79***
(0.02)
7.62***
(0.12)

0.95***
(0.01)
2.00***
(0.02)
.68***
(0.02)
2.73***
(0.03)
2.4***
(0.02)

1.06***
(0.01)
1.16***
(0.02)
2.58***
(0.04)
0.86***
(0.01)
1.34***
(0.02)

1.78***
(0.02)
1.33***
(0.02)
2.39***
(0.04)
3.93***
(0.05)
3.73***
(0.05)

0.63***
(0.01)
0.85***
(0.02)
0.93***
(0.02)
0.8***
(0.01)
1.12***
(0.02)

0.98
(0.01)
0.36***
(0.00)
0.47***
(0.01)
0.31
1,142,842

0.79***
(0.02)
0.29***
(0.01)
0.87***
(0.02)
0.24
1,142,842

1.79***
(0.03)
0.49***
(0.01)
0.61***
(0.01)
0.50
1,042,174

4.42***
(0.12)
0.99
(0.03)
1.57***
(0.04)
0.15
262,704

Note: Logit results presented in Table 4 are reported as odds ratios, with standard errors
reported in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p <0 .01, *** p < 0.001. Estimates for fixed effects for base
city and year are not reported in order to conserve space. “Pseudo R-squared” provides a
measure of goodness of fit of the statistical model.
a. “Relief Application” is among nonterminated cases that included at least one application for
relief (with or without an application for Voluntary Departure), with the base category
including cases with no application or application for Voluntary Departure only.
b. “Relief Grant” is among cases that included an application for relief.
c. Mexico is the base category for “Region.”
d. Aggravated felony is the base category for “Charge.”
e. “EWI” stands for Entry Without Inspection.

Next, we examined (in columns two through four) the relationship of
counsel to three key stages in the immigration removal process. The second
column of Table 4, “Case Termination,” indicates whether the immigrant’s
case was terminated. The third column, “Relief Application,” analyzes
whether the immigrant applied for relief, and the fourth, “Relief Grant,”
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indicates whether the immigrant’s application for relief was granted. The
results of this regression reported in the first row, “Counsel,” reveal that
removal respondents were significantly more likely to obtain successful
outcomes when represented by counsel. Specifically, after controlling for all
of the factors just described (detention status, region of nationality, charge,
year, and base city), the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants
with representation, as compared to those without, sought relief, five-and-ahalf times greater that they obtained relief from removal, and almost two
times greater that they had their case terminated.186
Because custody status was correlated with both representation and case
outcomes of interest,187 we also assessed the impact of counsel for detained and
nondetained respondents in separate regressions. The results of these analyses
are displayed in Table 5. The row titled “Counsel” displays the odds ratio
results first for detained respondents and second for nondetained respondents.
Among similarly situated detained immigrants, the odds were almost eleven
times greater that those with counsel (as compared to those without) sought
relief, three times greater that they successfully obtained relief, and a little over
four times greater that they had their case terminated. In addition, among
similarly situated nondetained immigrants, the odds were sixteen-and-a-half
times greater that those with counsel (as compared to those without) sought
relief, eight times greater that they successfully obtained relief, and one-and-ahalf times greater that they had their case terminated.
In short, at every stage in immigration court proceedings, representation
was associated with dramatically more successful case outcomes for
immigrant respondents. Moreover, this finding was robust. The significance
of immigration representation persisted when we examined all removal
cases together, as well as when we looked at detained and nondetained
cases separately.

186 We also assessed the extent to which correlation among respondents before the same
judge impacted the significance of our results by running the same regressions with standard
errors clustered by judge (not presented). We found no influence on the magnitude or the
significance of our key variables for case outcomes. We therefore report analyses using our full
sample without clustered standard errors.
187 See supra Figures 6 & 14.
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Table 5: Logit Regressions of the Effect of Representation in Detained and
Nondetained Cases, 2007–2012

Counsel
f

Region
Central America

South America
Caribbean
Asia
Other
g

Charge
Other Criminal
EWI

h

Other Immigration
Pseudo R-Squared
No. of observations

Case
a
Term.
4.13***
(0.09)

Detained
Relief
b
c
Appl.
Grant
10.64***
2.97***
(0.14)
(0.08)

Nondetained
Relief
Case
a, d
b
c, e
Term.
Appl.
Grant
1.52***
16.48***
8.01***
(0.01)
(0.16)
(0.17)

1.18***
(0.04)

2.16***
(0.04)

0.47***
(0.02)

0.98
(0.01)

1.58***
(0.02)

0.61***
(0.01)

1.30***
(0.07)
1.60***
(0.07)
1.60***
(0.07)
1.96***
(0.07)

1.64***
(0.05)
3.47***
(0.09)
3.44***
(0.09)
4.95***
(0.11)

0.83**
(0.05)
0.84***
(0.04)
0.82***
(0.04)
1.24***
(0.04)

1.10***
(0.02)
2.59***
(0.04)
0.79***
(0.01)
1.23***
(0.02)

1.23***
(0.02)
1.99***
(0.04)
3.88***
(0.06)
3.40***
(0.05)

0.84***
(0.02)
0.93**
(0.02)
0.77***
(0.01)
1.08***
(0.02)

0.94*
(0.03)
0.24***
(0.01)
0.64***
(0.02)
0.15
631,925

2.07***
(0.04)
0.29***
(0.01)
0.90***
(0.02)
0.38
621,584

5.47***
(0.18)
0.68***
(0.03)
2.55***
(0.10)
0.2
42,335

0.86***
(0.03)
0.39***
(0.01)
1.15***
(0.04)
0.11
510,913

1.16**
(0.05)
0.81***
(0.03)
0.84***
(0.04)
0.34
420,590

2.05***
(0.11)
0.54***
(0.03)
0.82***
(0.04)
0.14
220,331

Note: Logit results presented in Table 5 are reported as odds ratios, with standard errors reported
below in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p <0 .01, *** p < 0.001. Estimates for fixed effects for base city and
year are not reported to conserve space. “Pseudo R-Squared” provides a measure of goodness of fit of
the statistical model.
a. “Case Term.” stands for case termination.
b. “Relief Appl.” is among nonterminated cases that included at least one application for relief (with
or without an application for Voluntary Departure), with the base category including cases with no
application or application for Voluntary Departure only.
c. “Relief Grant” is among cases that included an application for relief.
d. A total of thirty-eight observations were dropped from the analysis because the base city fixed
effect predicted failure perfectly and could not be analyzed.
e. A total of four observations were dropped from the analysis because the base city fixed effect
predicted failure perfectly and could not be analyzed.
f. Mexico is the base category for “Region.”
g. Aggravated felony is the base category for “Charge.”
h. “EWI” stands for Entry Without Inspection.

The next Section turns to a less-tested aspect of the emerging debate
over access to counsel in immigration proceedings: the extent to which
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appointing counsel would promote court efficiencies. In other words, could
providing appointed counsel for immigrants in removal cases actually pay
for itself by reducing the duration of court adjudication?
B. Efficiency
The idea that legal representation will speed up court proceedings has
gained a foothold in the immigration field.188 Immigration judges surveyed
in 2011 almost unanimously agreed that they can adjudicate cases “more
efficiently and quickly” when the respondent “has a competent lawyer.”189 A
recent study conducted by NERA Economic Consulting at the request of
the New York Bar Association concluded that providing appointed counsel
for immigrants in removal cases could actually pay for itself.190 Key
assumptions in this analysis are that “cases with lawyers involved will
proceed more quickly from initiation of the cases to decisions by
immigration judges” and that “respondents with lawyers would be more
likely to secure release at the outset of removal proceedings through a
successful bond hearing.”191 More recently, in establishing a new legal
services program for immigrant children, Congress instructed EOIR to
explore how providing free lawyers might improve the efficiency of court
proceedings and save courts money.192
Despite such speculation by policymakers, advocates, and scholars that
providing representation accelerates court dockets, there is little empirical
analysis of such theories. Research on the Department of Justice’s Legal
Orientation Program, which provides know-your-rights trainings to
unrepresented litigants in detention, has demonstrated that the merits
proceedings of detained immigrants were completed more quickly when
respondents attended an educational orientation prior to coming to court.193
188 Margaret Taylor has cautioned against the growing embrace of efficiency rationales for
promoting legal services for detained immigrants. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal
Representation For Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1709
(1997) (“It is, in the end, a risky strategy to build support for increased legal representation at INS
detention facilities around the promise that detained aliens will be processed more efficiently.”).
189 BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27, at 56.
190 See Montgomery, supra note 17, at 35 (“I estimate that providing counsel for detainees
would more than pay for itself in terms of fiscal cost savings.”).
191 Id. at 5 (hypothesizing that cases will move more quickly “either due to fewer
continuances, or because a substantial number of detained respondents without any chance of
relief will accept deportation more quickly if well-counseled”).
192 See H.R. REP. No. 113-171, at 38 (2013) (“The Committee encourages EOIR, within the
funding provided, to explore ways to better serve vulnerable populations such as children and
improve court efficiency through pilot efforts aimed at improving their legal representation.”).
193 VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 49 fig.9.
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Yet no research has focused on the relationship between attorney
representation and court adjudication times. This Section draws on six years
of removal cases to address this question. Specifically, we focus on four key
aspects of court efficiency and representation by counsel: (1) court
continuances to find counsel; (2) litigation patterns in represented cases; (3)
release from detention; and (4) failures to appear in court.
1. Court Continuances to Find Counsel
As mentioned in Part I of this Article, immigration judges are required
to advise respondents of their right to be represented by counsel of their
own choosing.194 If the respondent is not represented by counsel at the
initial hearing, he or she may request additional time to find counsel. We
documented in Part I that 14% of detained respondents, 41% of released
respondents, and 25% of never-detained respondents obtained at least one
continuance to find counsel.195
Time spent seeking counsel is especially costly for detained cases, where the
government is expending money to house the respondents. The estimated cost
to detain an immigrant for day is $158.196 Moreover, as we demonstrated earlier
in this Article, the majority of detained immigrants who took additional time to
seek counsel were not successful in securing representation.197
The left side of Figure 16 shows how much time these continuances to
find counsel consumed over the life of those removal cases in which they
were granted. For detained respondents who were granted continuances to
find counsel, an average of 33 days was spent seeking counsel; for released
respondents an average of 98 days; and for those who were never detained
an average of 158 days.

194
195
196

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO
DETENTION: IMPROVED DATA C OLLECTION AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 18-19 (Nov. 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4HRK-X3J7]. For discussion of the social costs associated with detention, see
supra note 160.
197 See supra Figure 8.
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Figure 16: Court Time Spent in Search for Counsel,
by Custody Status, 2007–2012198

Note: “Time Seeking Counsel” includes median (hollow symbol) and average (solid symbol)
number of days between hearings adjourned to seek counsel and the subsequent hearing,
among those who had at least one hearing adjourned to seek counsel. “Percent of Total Case
Duration Seeking Counsel” is the median (hollow symbol) and average (solid symbol)
proportion of the entire case that was spent seeking counsel. Confidence intervals for mean
days and mean percent too narrow to present.

Although not all cases involved such continuances, for those that did, the
amount of time spent looking for an attorney was a significant portion of the
total case duration. As shown on the right side of Figure 16, on average the
amount of time spent seeking counsel was slightly more than half (50.4%) of
the total adjudication time for detained cases, 25% for released cases, and 42%
for never-detained cases.199
The findings of significant court days spent in search of counsel are
relevant to the establishment of a national public defender system. In such a
system, counsel could meet with their clients before the first court hearing.
Instead of coming to court only to ask for time to seek counsel, immigrants

198 To understand the methodology underlying Figure 16 and other measurements of case
duration in this Article, see infra Appendix, Part C.
199 In the Case Duration Sample, the average total case duration for cases with continuances
to find counsel was 125 days (SD = 242) for detained, 611 days (SD = 577) for released, and 676 days
(SD = 638) for never detained. See infra Appendix, Part C.
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could be prepared at the time of their first hearing to tell the judge how
they plan to proceed in the case.200
Thus, earlier evaluation of the cases would allow key decisions about
whether to agree to deportation (or, alternatively, to seek relief) to be made
sooner. For detained (or formerly detained) cases, appointing counsel would
reap cost savings associated with not having to pay to detain immigrants
while they search, often unsuccessfully, for counsel.201 For those immigrants
who are never subject to detention, appointed counsel could still assist with
improving court efficiency by reducing the number of court hearings
required to continue the case so that the immigrant can find counsel and
decide whether to pursue relief. We now address these efficiency issues in
more detail by looking closely at litigation patterns in cases with counsel.
2. Litigation Patterns in Represented Cases
In order to be relevant to the potential establishment of a public
defender system for immigration, our efficiency analysis must also take into
account the fact that cases with attorneys took longer on average than pro se
cases.202 In addition to the delays in finding counsel discussed in the
previous subsection, this subsection advances three additional factors that
are associated with these longer case times: (1) delays in attorney entrance
into represented cases; (2) the concentration of meritorious claims for relief
in represented cases; and (3) regional variation in case duration.
Furthermore, this subsection looks more closely at the cases that take up the
most time (those with claims for relief) and documents ways in which pro se
respondents may waste court resources, including by filing more claims that
rarely succeed and by not taking time to prepare for trial.

200 The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, see supra note 9, operates on such a
model, informing the judge as early as the first court appearance if a client is “prepared to be
deported.” Kirk Semple, New Help for Poor Immigrants Who Are in Custody and Facing Deportation,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/nyregion/new-help-for-poorimmigrants-who-are-in-custody-and-facing-deportation.html [http://perma.cc/28VZ-6WA4].
201 See supra Figures 7 & 8 (reporting the percentage of cases in which immigrants seek
counsel and success rates of finding counsel).
202 See infra notes 205 (detained adjudication times) and 206 (nondetained adjudication times).
For additional details on our methodology for measuring case duration, see infra Appendix, Part C.
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Figure 17: Total Case Duration in Removal Cases, by
Representation and Custody Status, 2007–2012

Note: “Total Case Duration” includes median (hollow symbol) and average (solid symbol)
number of days from first hearing until last hearing. Confidence intervals for mean days too
narrow to present.

Before proceeding, it is important to assess how much longer represented
cases take than unrepresented cases. In the detained context, as seen in Figure
17, the average total case duration for those with representation was 146 days
(SD = 297), compared to only 23 days (SD = 141) for pro se respondents.203
Nondetained cases took longer overall due to court backlogs and the low
priority204 given to these cases in immigration courts.205 But, even for the
nondetained (including both released and never detained), represented cases
203 Median total case duration for detained cases was 64 days for represented respondents
and 1 day for pro se respondents. See supra Figure 17. We also tested limiting the measurement of
case duration to the merits proceeding and found detained cases were still longer with counsel, 95
days (SD = 164) on average, compared to 14 days (SD = 75) for pro se respondents. Median
duration for the merits proceeding was 122 days for represented respondents, compared to 106
days for pro se respondents.
204 See Hearing on Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Juan P. Osuna, Director,
Executive Office for Immigration Review) (“The highest priority cases for EOIR are those
involving detained aliens.”).
205 In our Case Duration Sample, the average total case duration of detained cases was 44
days (SD = 184), compared to 545 days (SD = 562) for released cases and 493 days (SD = 607) for
never-detained cases.
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took longer on average: 667 days (SD = 621) for represented, compared to 183
days (SD = 383) for pro se respondents.206
Our analysis reveals that a number of factors are associated with these
longer case times. These longer case times can be partially attributed to
delays in attorney entrance into the cases. By analyzing when an attorney first
appeared in court, we find that an average of 35 days (SD = 90) passed before
an attorney appeared in a detained case. For nondetained cases, an average of
104 days (SD = 234) passed before an attorney appeared in court.207 These
delays in the attorneys’ entrance into the cases therefore account for some of
the time differences between pro se and represented cases.208 By contrast, in a
system of universal representation, attorneys could be appointed at or before
the initial court appearance. Presumably, with earlier attorney involvement in
an appointed system, the average length of cases would shrink.
Another factor that contributes to longer case times on average for
represented cases is that claims for relief are highly concentrated in those
few cases that have representation.209 That 86% of cases with claims for
relief had representation means that these cases require time to
accommodate preparation of the application and to schedule the trial with
the court. By contrast, pro se cases decided during the six-year period of our
study had a median duration of only 1 day. If these cases were handled by
attorneys, some claims would be found, but overall the average time for
represented cases would undoubtedly decrease.
206 Median total case duration for nondetained respondents was 497 days for represented
respondents and 1 day for pro se respondents. We also tested limiting the measurement of case
duration to the merits proceeding and found nondetained cases were still longer with counsel, with
an average of 95 days (SD = 164) for represented respondents, compared to 14 days (SD = 75) for
pro se respondents. Median duration for the merits proceeding was 50 days for represented
respondents, compared to 1 day for pro se respondents.
207 Medians are informative here too: the median nondetained respondent had an attorney
appear two weeks after the case began, while the median detained respondent had an attorney
appear at the first hearing.
208 In order to determine how long it took for a represented respondent to obtain
representation, we analyzed hearing-level data across the entire case. Specifically, we measured the
number of days between the first hearing in the case and the date of the first hearing where an
attorney was present. We found this measurement to be more reliable than an alternative method
of using the number of days until the EOIR-28 was filed because on average attorneys appeared in
court before the EOIR-28 filing date. On average, attorneys in detained cases appeared in court 7
days before the EOIR-28 filing date, and attorneys in nondetained cases appeared in court 123
days before the EOIR-28 filing date. This makes sense, as the EOIR database can only
accommodate one filing date for a case, and in practice there are multiple reasons why more than
one form will be filed in a single case, including for respondents who obtained more than one
attorney, see supra Figure 5, for attorneys who changed firms, and for cases that changed venue.
209 See supra Figure 15 (comparing pro se and represented rates of applying for
relief from removal).
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Table 6: Efficiency Measurements in Detained Cases with Applications for
Relief from Removal, Based on Total Case Duration, 2007–2012
Pro Se
Measure
Case Time
(Days)
Case Time
(Days) Until
Att’y Appears
Applications
Relief
Voluntary
Departure
Hearings
Respondent
Continuances
to Prepare
Proportion Cases
Granted Relief

Counsel

Median
133

Mean
255

SD
453

Median
166

Mean
314

SD
456

—

—

—

21

46

90

1

1.69

1.19

1

1.50

1.13

0

0.14

0.35

0

0.10

0.3

6

7.12

4.02

7

7.65

4.56

0

0.50

1.10

1

1.14

1.57

—

.23

—

—

.47

—

Note: Among detained respondents who applied for relief from removal (case time, applications, and relief grant, Pro Se n = 18,275, Counsel n = 34,860; continuances and hearings, Pro
Se n = 17,184, Counsel n = 32,617). All mean differences are statistically significant at p < .001,
two-tailed difference of means t-test; differences in relief grants rates are also significant at p <
.001, two-tailed difference of proportions test.

Table 6 addresses these issues more systematically by narrowing the
comparison of total case duration to only one category of cases: detained cases
with relief applications. For this category of cases, total case duration for pro se
litigants was on average 59 days faster than for those with counsel. However, as
the other data in Table 6 underscore, there is more to court efficiency than
total days between the first and last court hearing in individual cases.210 Most

210 Studies of other court systems have found that judicial involvement with represented
cases may be less overall, thus counterbalancing inefficiencies associated with long adjudication
times. See, e.g., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance, supra note 163, at 933-34 (determining that,
although represented cases took a longer average number of days to complete, they did not
increase the burden on the court because the extended time was offset by lawyers who
“investigated facts and negotiated settlements,” leading to settlement without the court’s
involvement); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New
York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 429
(2001) (finding that, despite the fact that the mean days for represented cases to final judgment
compared to unrepresented cases was 131 versus 82 days, “the presence of an attorney at the
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importantly, as the second row of Table 6 reveals, on average attorneys took 46
days to appear in court. This alone accounts for the majority of the difference
in overall case length between pro se and represented cases.
Another relevant difference is that pro se detained cases seeking relief
filed more applications with the court. As seen in Table 6, pro se detained
respondents that sought relief, when compared to their represented
counterparts, filed slightly more applications for relief on average (1.69 versus
1.50) and more applications for voluntary departure than cases with attorneys
that sought relief (0.14 versus 0.10). More applications by pro se relief seekers,
which could be due to uncertainty as to what type of relief to pursue in the
absence of a legal advisor, necessarily increase court workload.211
Detained cases without counsel also filed more unsuccessful claims with
the court: while 47% of cases with representation were successful, only 23%
of cases without counsel obtained relief. This could signal that pro se
respondents were unprepared to present their claims. Or, it could reflect
that pro se respondents tended to present less meritorious claims—the kind
which an appointed lawyer could have advised them not to pursue, and
instead convinced them to agree to removal or seek only voluntary
departure. Finally, detained cases with counsel had more continuances to
prepare for trial: just over one on average, compared to only one-half in pro
se cases (and a median of one for those with counsel versus zero for pro
se).212 Continuances to prepare necessarily ease the burden on courts by
allowing the respondent to be better prepared to address complex issues
that may arise at trial.
Our analysis of nondetained removal cases with relief applications
yielded similar results, which are displayed in Table 7. While represented
nondetained cases were on average longer than similar pro se cases (836
versus 701 days), there was an average delay of 93 days before an attorney
appeared in court. There was no statistically significant difference in the
number of relief applications (represented filed an average of 1.81 versus
1.79 in pro se cases), but pro se applicants were more likely to seek
voluntary departure (0.13 for represented versus 0.17 for pro se). Pro se
respondents also had slightly more hearings during the life of their case
(6.83 for represented versus 6.98 for pro se), and were less likely to achieve
relief (62% for represented versus 34% for pro se).

tenant’s side may actually enhance [court] efficiency by reducing the number of motions,
particularly post-judgment motions”).
211 Note that median applications for relief and voluntary departure are the same.
212 Across our entire National Sample, 41% of represented cases included at least one
continuance for time to prepare during the case’s total duration, compared to only 5% of pro se cases.
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Table 7: Efficiency Measurements in Nondetained Cases with Applications for
Relief from Removal, Based on Total Case Duration, 2007–2012213
Pro Se
Measure
Case Time
(Days)
Case Time
(Days) Until
Att’y Appears
Applications
Relief
Voluntary
Departure
Hearings
Respondent
Continuances
to Prepare
Proportion Cases
Granted Relief

Counsel

Median
544

Mean
701

SD
609

Median
649

Mean
836

SD
660

—

—

—

0

93

231

2

1.79NS

1.26

2

1.81

1.29

0

0.17

0.38

0

0.13

0.34

6

6.98

4.7

6

6.83

4.37

0

0.54

1.08

0

0.59

1.02

—

.34

—

—

.62

—

Note: Among nondetained immigrants who applied for relief from removal and who were not
ordered removed in absentia (case time, applications, and relief grant Pro Se n = 10,763,
Counsel n = 261,582; continuances and hearings Pro Se n = 10,381, Counsel n = 256,283).
Superscript NS means the average difference was not statistically significant. All other average
differences significant at p < .001, two-tailed difference of means t-test; differences in relief
grant rates are also significant at p < .001, two-tailed difference of proportions test.

Another factor influencing case length is regional variation. Figure 18
contains average case adjudication times for detained cases with relief
applications in the base cities with the highest volumes of detained
immigration cases.214 This figure displays the disparity in case adjudication
times across different jurisdictions. For example, in Lumpkin, Georgia, total
case duration for detained cases with claims was an average of 101 days
longer for represented cases than for pro se cases. In contrast, pro se cases
with claims were not significantly shorter than represented cases in:
Oakdale, Louisiana; Houston, Texas; and Miami, Florida.215 Furthermore,
213 Cases that ended in removal in absentia were omitted from the analysis presented in
Table 7. For additional discussion of in absentia removal orders in immigration court, see infra
notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
214 See supra Figure 10a.
215 The differences in total case duration by representation status for these detained removal
cases seeking relief in Miami (n = 4994), Houston (n = 2521), and Oakdale (n = 978) are not
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unrepresented cases in some jurisdictions (such as Eloy, Arizona and
Adelanto, California) took far longer than represented cases in others (such
as El Paso, Texas and Miami, Florida). These data help to underscore that
much of what drives the amount of time it takes for cases to reach a decision
is based on local practice and docket pressures, rather than something
inherent in lawyer involvement in the cases.
Figure 18: Mean Total Case Duration in Detained Removal Cases Seeking
Relief, by High-Volume Base City and Representation Status, 2007–2012

Note: “Total Case Duration” is the average number of days from first hearing until last hearing
for cases within each city for pro se (hollow dot) and represented (solid dot) respondents.
Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

This subsection has shown that a significant portion of case duration in
both detained and nondetained cases is consumed with a search for counsel.
Although represented cases on average take longer than pro se cases to
conclude, when cases with claims are analyzed separately, represented cases
reveal certain efficiency gains, including fewer hearings and more successful
claims. As we demonstrate in the rest of this Section, other aspects of
efficiency include whether individuals eligible for release are unnecessarily

statistically significant (two-tailed difference of means t-test). Differences are significant for
Lumpkin (n = 485), Eloy (n = 3123), El Paso (n = 2054) (p < .001), Adelanto (n = 2599) (p < .01),
and Tacoma (n = 2095) (p < .05).
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held in detention or fail to appear at future court appearances. On both of
these measurements, we find that represented cases are more efficient.
3. Release from Detention
The third aspect of our efficiency analysis considers the role attorneys
play in helping their clients seek release from detention. The high cost of
detention makes these cases the most costly for the federal government to
handle.216 To the extent that attorney involvement can facilitate the release
of clients that should not be subject to detention, having counsel is
associated with efficiency gains in removal adjudication.
Early in the detention process, some immigrants are released by
immigration officers at the detention center.217 Those who remain detained
may ask the immigration judge for a custody redetermination,218 provided
they are statutorily eligible.219 Immigrants who are granted bond will be
released if they are financially able to post the required amount.220 If a
detained immigrant is released, the government no longer incurs detention
216
217

See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2015) (permitting immigration officers to release detainees if the
alien does not pose a threat to property or persons and is likely to appear at court proceedings).
218 See id. § 1003.19(a) (requiring custody and bond determinations to be considered by an
immigration judge); id. § 1236.1(d) (allowing immigrants in custody to seek reconsideration of and to
appeal a bail decision). In a pathbreaking recent decision, the District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a preliminary injunction to bar detention officers from denying eligibility for bond based on
consideration of “mass migration.” R.I.L-R v. Johnson, No. 15-11 (JEB) (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015).
219 Some immigrants are subject to mandatory detention. See I.N.A. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) (2012) (requiring the detention of certain classes of aliens). Courts have, however, begun
to recognize due process limitations on mandatory detention. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715
F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that immigrants held beyond six months must be given
individualized bond hearings to justify continued detention). For an argument that immigrants
subject to mandatory detention ought to nonetheless be allowed to access supervised release
programs, see Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit,
and the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (2015). For a critique of the
mandatory detention rules, see Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010).
220 Many immigrants are not able to afford the high bonds set by immigration judges. Cf.
I.N.A. § 236(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (2012) (setting the minimum bond amount at $1500
when the immigrant is not granted conditional parole). In custody hearings we observed around the
country, bond amounts set by judges ranged from $1500 on the low end to as high as $50,000. Other
recent research has attempted to uncover the bond amounts set by immigration judges in practice. See
ACLU, RESTORING DUE PROCESS: HOW BOND HEARINGS UNDER RODRIGUEZ V. ROBBINS HAVE
HELPED END ARBITRARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION 4 fig.4a (Dec. 2014), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/assets/restoringdueprocess-aclusocal.pdf [http://perma.cc/KX37-R7QW] (finding
that the average bond amount in a Central District of California federal suit challenging long-term
detention was $15,883 and the median amount was approximately $10,000); REPRESENTATION IN
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, supra note 14, at 20 (calculating the average bond amount set by San
Francisco immigration court judges during the study period to be $5742).
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costs; instead, the case is transferred to the nondetained docket and the
immigrant can return to his or her community. In contrast, especially for
immigrants who pursue claims for relief from detention, detention can be
quite lengthy and therefore costly to the government.221
Figure 19: Frequency of Custody Hearings and Release Among
Immigrants Represented by Counsel, 2007–2012222

Our data reveal that represented immigrants were more likely than those
who went unrepresented to secure a custody hearing before the judge.
Overall, as the left side of Figure 19 displays, represented detainees were
almost seven times more likely than their pro se counterparts to be released
from the detention center (48% versus 7%). As shown in the middle of Figure
19, of individuals who were detained at some point during their case, 44% of
represented detainees were granted a custody hearing before the judge,
compared to only 18% of pro se detainees.223 This increase in custody hearings
221 As we show in Table 6, supra, the mean total case duration for detained removal cases was
255 days for those without counsel and 314 days for those with counsel.
222 Figure 19 measures the frequency of adjourned “custody hearings,” also known as custody
redetermination hearings, and “release,” which means actual release from the detention center.
Both detained and formerly detained (i.e., released) respondents are included in Figure 19’s
calculations. All differences between pro se and represented respondents were statistically
significant (p < .001, two-tailed difference of proportions test).
223 Because custody hearings may precede the first merits proceeding, we looked through the
entire case history of proceedings completed on or before the merits completion to determine if a
custody hearing was held.
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may indicate that having an attorney is helpful in navigating the complex
rules governing eligibility for custody hearings.224 In addition, once a custody
hearing was held, represented litigants were more likely to be released from
custody. Of those respondents with custody hearings, as seen on the far right
of Figure 19, 44% of represented respondents were released, compared to only
11% of pro se respondents.
These findings are consistent with a recent empirical study by Emily
Ryo showing that immigration judges were significantly more likely to grant
bond to long-term detainees who had counsel, as compared to similarly
situated detainees who appeared pro se at their custody hearing.225 Studies
in the criminal court context have also found that defendants with
representation at the bond hearing are more likely to secure release.226
Importantly, this analysis of the relationship between release and
representation is necessarily incomplete. For example, the fact that some
immigrants are subject to mandatory detention under the immigration law
limits the pool of individuals that can be granted custody hearings by
immigration judges.227 In addition, respondents can be released by their
detention officers without ever benefiting from having an attorney argue on
their behalf at a custody hearing. Indeed, among those immigrants in our
sample who were released, only 37% had a custody hearing before an
immigration judge, demonstrating that their release was not based on a
court order. Analysis of custody hearings is also unsatisfactory because
immigrants may remain detained due to an inability to afford the bond

224 Detention rules are notoriously complex. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “prolonged detention must be accompanied
by appropriate procedural safeguards, including a hearing to establish whether releasing the alien
would pose a danger to the community or a flight risk”); In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806
(B.I.A. 1999) (holding that a lawful permanent resident may show that mandatory detention does
not apply because DHS is “substantially unlikely to establish . . . the charge or charges that would
otherwise subject the [respondent] to mandatory detention”).
225 See Ryo, supra note 182 (finding that pro se long-term detainees granted bond hearings were
three-and-a-half times less likely to be granted bond than those who were represented by counsel).
226 See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for
the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1755-56 (2002) (concluding that
represented defendants in criminal cases were more likely than pro se defendants to be released on
their own recognizance, to have their initial bail amount reduced, and to serve less jail time).
227 See I.N.A. § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012) (requiring the detention of certain
classes of immigrants). But see Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding
that immigrants held beyond six months must receive individualized bond hearings to justify
continued detention). For a salient critique of the immigration system’s use of mandatory
detention without providing counsel to immigrants, see Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional
Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012).
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amount set.228 Thus, although a judge’s release order may reflect the judge’s
assessment of flight risk and danger,229 successful release on bond also
correlates with the immigrant’s financial status and family support.230
Nonetheless, attorney representation could make a difference in these various
contexts, including through informal advocacy to secure release from the
detention officer and by assisting family members in gathering and posting
the required bond amount.
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that early involvement of attorneys
in detained cases is associated with an increased likelihood of release from
detention. Nearly half of represented immigrants were released from
custody, compared to only 7% of pro se litigants.
4. Failures to Appear in Court
Immigrants who are not detained must appear in court at a later date for
their immigration removal hearing. If, however, the respondent fails to
appear for one or more of these hearings, the judge will be forced to enter a
removal order without the immigrant being present.231 These removal
orders issued when the immigrant fails to appear are referred to in practice
as in absentia removal orders.232
Addressing failures to appear in immigration court is a long-standing
priority issue for immigration courts.233 The prevalence of in absentia
orders has increased over time.234 Moreover, the Department of Justice has
found that immigrants who fail to come to court and are ordered removed

228 In our site visits, we observed that immigrants frequently requested bond reduction
because their family could not afford the amount set by the detention officer. In many cases they
did not obtain the requested reduction.
229 See generally DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
CRIMES § 8:18 (2011 ed.) (discussing factors that the court must weigh in making bond determinations);
Bonds/Custody, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 124, at 6-7 (same).
230 See supra note 220 (discussing bond amounts in detained immigration courts).
231 See I.N.A. § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring an alien to be
removed if he or she does not attend a removal proceeding and the government establishes “by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that . . . written notice was . . . provided and that the
alien is removable”).
232 See, e.g., 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 74, at 7 (defining “In Absentia Order” as used
in the Yearbook).
233 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL
YEARS 2005-2010 STRATEGIC PLAN 10 (Sept. 2004), http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/law/
US_DOJ/FinalTEREOIRStrategicPlan2005-2010September%202004.pdf [http://perma.cc/L264XNBS] (explaining that one of EOIR’s strategic goals is to study “failure-to-appear” rates).
234 See, e.g., 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 74 at P3 & P3 fig.25 (reporting that in absentia orders
for released respondents increased by 123% in the period between fiscal years 2009 and 2013).
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in absentia are unlikely to be removed in the future.235 Consequently, in
absentia orders reduce the immigration court’s ability to function as an
adjudicative body that renders meaningful decisions.
In an early study of failures to appear, the Vera Institute for Justice
found that immigrants who participated in a community supervision
program were more likely than those who lacked supervision to attend all of
their immigration hearings and to comply with their final order.236 In a later
study, Vera found that immigrants who were released from custody after
participating in the Department of Justice’s know-your-rights program were
7% less likely than those who did not participate in the program to be
removed in absentia.237 Yet, as Vera researchers acknowledged at the time,
representation by an attorney was “more strongly associated with reduced in
absentia orders” than know-your-rights programming.238
We analyzed the relationship between in absentia removal orders and
representation in the nondetained court population.239 The results are
remarkable. As seen on the left of Figure 20, 68% of pro se nondetained
respondents were removed in absentia, compared to only 7% of nondetained
cases with legal representation.240 Put differently, over the six-year period
studied, only 32% of nondetained pro se respondents showed up to court,
compared to 93% of nondetained respondents with counsel.

235 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, REP. NO. I-2003-004, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S
REMOVAL OF ALIENS ISSUED FINAL ORDERS 13 (Feb. 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/

reports/INS/e0304/final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PFF-SP6H] (“We examined the correlation between
removals and court attendance and found that the aliens’ failure to appear before the Immigration
Judge at removal proceedings is a significant and strong negative indicator for the likelihood of
removal by the INS.”).
236 See 1 EILEEN S ULLIVAN ET AL., TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE P ROGRAM, at ii (2000),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/INS_finalreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/
TA6N-84VA] (finding that 91% of immigrants under supervision attended court hearings and that
supervision almost doubled the rate of compliance with final orders).
237 VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 57 fig.14.
238 Id. at 56 n.68.
239 For our coding methodology, see infra Appendix, Part A.
240 This finding of a strong association between in absentia removals and pro se status is even
more striking than that published in the Vera Institute’s 2008 study. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note
16, at 59 (finding an in absentia rate for released unrepresented persons of 62%, compared to only 17% for
represented persons).
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Figure 20: Rates of In Absentia Removal Orders for Nondetained Removal
Respondents, by Application Status, 2007–2012

When we isolated only those respondents who were ordered removed by
the judge, the difference was even more dramatic. As seen in the second set
of bars in Figure 20, 90% of pro se respondents with removal orders were
removed in absentia, versus only 29% of represented respondents with
removal orders.241 Likewise, as the next two sets of bars in Figure 20 reveal,
these differences in rates of in absentia removal between the represented
and unrepresented persisted even when we accounted for whether a relief
application was pursued. Pro se applicants for asylum or other types of
relief, as compared to their represented counterparts, were ten times more
likely to be removed in absentia.
Together, these findings suggest that representation by counsel is
strongly associated with immigrants coming to court and participating in
their hearings. One reason why represented immigrants may be more likely
241 New research by Emily Ryo finds that lack of compliance with immigration law by
unauthorized migrants is connected to their belief that “current U.S. immigration policy is neither
in alignment with their expressed moral values nor legitimate.” Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More
Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 629 (2015). See also Leisy J.
Abrego, Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear and Stigma as Barriers to Claims-Making
for First- and 1.5-Generation Immigrants, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 363-64 (2011) (finding that
claimmaking by immigrants is limited by feelings of fear and social stigma). In the context of
immigrant removal, the provision of universal counsel may go a long way toward increasing
compliance with immigration law and claimmaking by immigrants, precisely because it would
demystify and enhance the perceived legitimacy of the immigration court process.
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to attend all of their hearings is because of the role counsel plays in guiding
their clients and advising them of their hearings.242 This participation
makes the immigration removal decisions of the nation’s immigration courts
even more meaningful.
In summary, involvement of counsel in immigration cases was associated
with measurable gains in court efficiency. Represented respondents were
less likely to use valuable court and detention time seeking counsel, and
they were also more likely to be released from custody. Finally, once
released, represented immigrants were more likely to appear at their
subsequent removal hearings. Access to counsel can ease the burdens carried
by both immigrants and courts.
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this Article is largely descriptive—to provide a data-driven
context for future discussion of the pivotal issue of access to counsel in
United States immigration courts. We reveal that during the time period of
our study, 63% of all immigrants went to court without an attorney.
Detained immigrants were even less likely to obtain counsel—86% attended
their court hearings without an attorney. For immigrants held in remote
detention centers, the ability to obtain counsel was even more severely
impaired—only 10% of detained immigrants in small cities obtained counsel,
yet more than 200,000 immigrants had their cases heard in these far-away
detention centers. Furthermore, some cities with active immigration courts
did not have a single practicing immigration attorney.
The bottom line is that the cases of poor immigrants are left to legal
services attorneys, law school clinical programs, and pro bono volunteers.
Yet, during the six years of our study, we estimate that only 2% of
immigrants in removal proceedings obtained counsel from these types of
free representation programs. The volume of removal cases is simply too
great for existing immigrant aid resources to cover.
Parts I and II of this Article outlined the gross inequality of access to
counsel across nationality, geography, and detention status. Our findings in
Part III focused on questions of efficacy and efficiency of attorney
involvement in immigration courts. By looking at court files in over 1.2
million removal cases, we showed that attorneys were strongly associated
242 As Sabrineh Ardalan argues in the context of asylum cases, pro se applicants struggle to
navigate the court system, especially when hearings are scheduled with little warning and notices
are sent to old addresses. See Ardalan, supra note 116, at 1017 (noting that “[t]hese types of
bureaucratic failures have serious consequences in asylum cases, where a missed court date can lead
the court to issue an in absentia removal order”).

76

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1

with positive outcomes in the cases where they provided representation.
Our regression analysis, which controlled for numerous case- and
respondent-specific characteristics, reported this result most dramatically:
the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with representation, as
compared to those without, sought relief, and five-and-a-half times greater
that they obtained relief. Other analyses presented in this Article also
documented a strong relationship between representation by counsel and
successful case outcomes. Tellingly, over a six-year period only 2% of
immigrants without counsel prevailed in their cases.
Our analysis in Part III introduced a sophisticated understanding of the
relationship between attorney representation and court efficiencies. We
identified three areas in which representation was associated with certain
improvements in court adjudication goals. First, pro se litigants consume
valuable court time with continuances to seek counsel. These continuances
are particularly costly for detained litigants, who are unlikely to find
counsel. Second, represented litigants are more likely to obtain a custody
hearing and be released on bond. When immigrants are released from
custody, expenditures on detention are eliminated. Finally, for released and
never-detained respondents, representation is associated with considerably
lower rates of failures to appear. When immigrants subject to removal do
not come to court, immigration courts cannot do their job.
The potential establishment of a public defender corps for the
immigration system raises implementation questions similar to those faced
by the criminal justice system in the pre-Gideon era. If attorneys were to be
appointed for all immigrants facing removal, how might their appointment
change the outcomes for immigrant respondents, the functioning of
immigration courts, and the overall structure of the immigration removal
system? Deciding whether and how to incorporate a system for appointed
counsel representation necessarily requires a careful balancing of competing
values of equality of access to counsel, efficacy of counsel in the
immigration court context, and the efficiency of courts that incorporate
appointed counsel. These issues should continue to be the subject of future
research, including by closely studying pilot projects and pro bono
initiatives that provide universal representation and by conducting
experiments in which counsel is randomly assigned.
Our findings provide an urgent national portrayal of the severity of
barriers to accessing counsel in immigration courts. Moreover, we show that
attorneys are associated with dramatically higher rates of success for
respondents and certain improvements in court efficiency. At the national
level, meaningfully expanding counsel for immigrants demands serious
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thinking about the structure of immigration courts, which currently operate
without lawyers in most cases. The empirical evidence presented in this
Article provides an essential framework for these future discussions.
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APPENDIX
The immigration court data analyzed in this Article were originally
collected by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the
Justice Department division responsible for administering the nation’s
immigration court system. We obtained the data for analysis in this Article
in our capacity as Fellows of the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University.243 Researchers at TRAC
obtained the data from EOIR by submitting requests pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act.244
The complete EOIR database that we received includes 6,165,128
individual immigration proceedings which span from fiscal years 1951 to 2013.
Following the procedures discussed in this Appendix, these data were reduced
to an analytical sample of 1,206,633 individual removal cases in which
immigration judges reached a decision between fiscal years 2007 and 2012.
Before beginning our analysis, we first reviewed the EOIR data for
completeness and accuracy. We performed validity checks by comparing the
data with the EOIR’s annual statistical reporting of the same data.245 We
also reviewed other publications that analyzed EOIR immigration court
data, including those by government researchers,246 nonprofit research
organizations,247 and legal scholars.248
The Immigration and Nationality Act,249 as well as expository texts and
practice manuals,250 site visits to immigration courts,251 and interviews with
practicing immigration attorneys252 provided the overall legal context for
243 For more background on TRAC and its process for gathering public records, see About
Us, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.
html [http://perma.cc/FPP5-EDR6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
244 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
245 Each year, EOIR publishes a lengthy statistical report. See, e.g., 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13.
246 See, e.g., BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 27; INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra
note 136; GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 58.
247 See, e.g., VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16; Kerwin, supra note 58 (note that this was
written when the author was Executive Director of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network,
Inc.); Asylum Disparities Persist, Regardless of Court Location and Nationality, TRANSACTIONAL
REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 24, 2007), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/183
[http://perma.cc/MW27-862T].
248 See, e.g., Linda Camp Keith et al., Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates Among
Immigration Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach, 35 LAW & POL’Y 261 (2013); RamjiNogales et al., supra note 15.
249 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq).
250 See, e.g., KESSELBRENNER & R OSENBERG, supra note 229.
251 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the patterns observed in the data. In analyzing the coding used in the EOIR
database, we also relied on other interpretative materials obtained from
EOIR through FOIA requests. These include EOIR’s data coding lookup
tables,253 data management training manuals,254 court operating policies and
procedures,255 and judicial training materials.256
A. Coding of Case, Hearing, and Respondent Characteristics
In conducting the analysis presented in this Article, we first coded the
EOIR data for a number of case, hearing, and respondent characteristics.
Representation by Counsel. Respondents with a Notice of Entry of
Appearance form (known as an “EOIR-28”) filed with the court prior to the
completion of the merits proceeding were treated as represented by counsel.
If the EOIR-28 was filed on the same day as the completion of the merits
proceeding, we counted the respondent as represented. In addition, if an
EOIR-28 form was filed after the completion of the merits proceeding, the
respondent was counted as represented by counsel if an attorney appeared in
at least one hearing within the relevant merits proceeding.257 For purposes of
253 Through FOIA, TRAC obtained from EOIR twelve lookup files to facilitate the proper
identification of the values in the data.
254 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE DATA ENTRY COURSE
LESSON PLAN, VERSION 1.3 (July 16, 2010) (obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2013-15030);
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE HELP DESK FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (Dec. 23, 2010) (obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2014-7182); EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE TRAINING MANUAL, DRAFT VERSION 4.0 (Dec. 2003)
(obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2013-15030); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
UNIFORM DOCKETING SYSTEM MANUAL (Apr. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
eoir/legacy/2014/04/07/DocketManual_12_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/ER3V-GNEX]; Adjournment
Code Memo, supra note 126.
255 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DIGITAL AUDIO RECORDING USER
MANUAL, VERSION 3.3 (Oct. 24, 2012) (obtained by authors with FOIA Request #2014-7182); COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 65; Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge,
Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to All Assistant Chief Immigration Judges et al. (Aug. 18, 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm04/04-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6SF-H7CA].
256 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, CASE COURSE
ADMINISTRATOR COURSE LESSON PLAN, VERSION 1.1 (July 2, 2010) (obtained by authors
with FOIA Request #2013-15030); IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 124,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook [http://perma.cc/237D-398A].
257 We identified approximately 33,000 cases where an attorney appeared in court, but never
filed an EOIR-28 form with the court. Consistent with the methodology used by both EOIR and
the Vera Institute, we coded these cases as unrepresented. We did, however, analyze these cases
and found that they have characteristics more consistent with having had no representation during
the merits proceeding. Compared to represented respondents, they were significantly more likely
to be detained, have no application for relief, and lack an individual hearing (p < .001, two-tailed
differences of proportions test). In addition, their total case duration was significantly shorter
(p < .001, two-tailed differences of means t-test).
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measuring whether the attorney appeared, we relied on the EOIR attorney
identification code entry at the hearing level (eoirattorneyid field).258
Out of our total sample of 1,206,633 removal cases, 465,018 cases had
EOIR-28 forms on file, of which 35,119 forms were filed after the conclusion
of the merits proceeding. Of these cases, however, approximately half (n =
17,253) had an attorney appear in at least one hearing during the merits
proceeding.259 Therefore, we counted these cases as represented.260 The
remaining 17,866 cases with late-filed EOIR-28 forms261 had no attorney
recorded as present at any merits hearing and were counted as
unrepresented.262
Detention Status. The EOIR data classify each case with one of three
case-level codes for custody status. A detained respondent is coded as “D.”
Respondents who are initially detained but later released—on bond or some
alternative type of condition—are coded as “R.” If EOIR has no record of
the respondent ever having been detained, the code “N” is used.
Hearing-Level Coding. We included hearing-level characteristics when
analyzing our final sample of 1,206,633 removal cases. EOIR maintains a
database for every hearing scheduled in a given case, including the hearing
type (e.g., “Initial Master” or “Custody”), the adjournment date, and the
adjournment reason (e.g., “Alien to Seek Representation”). These hearing
data also include a unique EOIR attorney identification code that identifies
the attorney that was present at the hearing.
We summarized hearing-level characteristics for each case. Hearings not
likely to have taken place were removed from all calculations. For example,
if the first hearing of a case was adjourned due to unplanned leave by
258 Some research has relied on EOIR’s alien_atty_code field to determine representation.
We rely on the eoirattorneyid field, however, because it is a more specific identifier, is more
commonly used to identify attorneys at the hearing level, and allows us to connect hearing-level
data to attorney characteristics. In our data, only a small number of cases (n = 123) were populated
by the alien_atty_code field but not the EOIR attorney identification code. In those cases, we
counted the immigrant as pro se.
259 In order to assess whether the immigrant was represented in any hearing in the merits
proceeding, we relied on the EOIR attorney identification information entered at the hearing level.
260 Under EOIR’s accounting system, all of these cases would be counted as represented.
Under the Vera Institute’s accounting system, all of these cases would be counted as pro se.
261 A small number of these cases with a late-filed EOIR-28 form (n = 478) lacked any
hearing-level data (i.e., we could not confirm attorney presence). The rest had hearing-level data
but none included any record documenting that an attorney came to court.
262 Before classifying these 17,866 cases as pro se, we conducted additional analysis and
confirmed that they had characteristics consistent with no representation during the merits
proceeding. Compared to late filers with an attorney present, they were significantly more likely to
be detained, have no application for relief, and lack an individual hearing (p < .001, two-tailed
differences of proportions test), and their total case duration was significantly shorter (p < .001,
two-tailed differences of means t-test).
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an immigration judge, that hearing would not count towards the total
number hearings.
Attorney Type. EOIR maintains a database of attorney-level
characteristics for each attorney who appears in immigration court. These
characteristics include attorney name, firm name, and firm address, as well
as the same unique EOIR attorney identification code as included in the
hearing-level data.
To characterize the type of attorney representing each respondent, we
coded each attorney as being involved in one of several organizational types,
based on the attorney name, firm name, and firm address.263 We were able to
associate 87% of represented cases (n = 447,152) with one or more specific
attorneys. For those cases in which no attorney appeared at any hearing (n =
49,924), we were unable to determine attorney type and these cases were
excluded from the analysis. In addition, we excluded the small number of cases
for which we were missing hearing-level data (n = 3813) or lacked reliable
attorney information because of administrative errors in the data (n = 4884).
The following organizational types were used: Nonprofit (including
religious organizations); Law School Clinic; Public Defender; Large Firm
(more than 100 attorneys); Medium Firm (from 11 to 100 attorneys); Small
Firm (10 or fewer attorneys)264; Government (not including public
defender); and In-House Counsel. In making these categorizations, we
researched attorney names and associated organizations in web searches, as
well as through databases maintained by state bar associations and the
membership list of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA).
To further ensure reliability, we then conducted random checks on this
coding as well as general analysis of coding patterns.265
Attorneys per Base City. Our analytical sample of removal cases contained
48,305 unique attorney identification numbers. In order to calculate the
number of attorneys that appeared in immigration courts by base city, we
took into account that some attorneys had more than one attorney

263 For this analysis, we relied on the EOIR attorney identification codes and corresponding
data on those attorneys. For attorney entries without a firm name, we identified organizational
type by matching entries with the same address that had already been categorized.
264 In categorizing attorneys as belonging to small firms, the following were included:
(1) entries with an organizational name that matched the attorney name; (2) entries that contained
the phrase “Law Office of ” or “Law Offices of ”; and (3) entries with an organizational name that
lacked any web presence.
265 For example, we ensured that attorneys with the same name at the same address had the
same firm type.
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identification number.266 Where the identification numbers varied, we used
attorney name and address to ensure that we counted unique attorneys.267
Base City. During the six-year period that we analyzed, the EOIR
database contains fifty-five different court jurisdictions, known as “base
cities.” We used hearing-level data to determine the jurisdiction for a case,
because the hearing-level data included more recent base city designations
than the proceeding-level data provided by EOIR.268 Using the hearinglevel data, we coded each respondent’s case as occurring in the base city in
which the judge’s decision on the merits was rendered. For those cases that
lacked coding of the base city at the hearing level, we relied instead on base
city associated with the case in the EOIR master record.
Base City Size. We coded each immigration court jurisdiction included in
our study based on the size of the city in which the court is located.269 In
determining city size, we relied on 2010 population data collected by the
United States Census Bureau to create three categories for city size.270
Small Cities are those cities with populations up to 50,000.271 Medium

266 For example, some attorneys had a different identification number in each base city where
that attorney practiced.
267 The data presented in Table 2 rely on this coding method to ensure we counted only
unique attorneys, rather than unique identification codes.
268 For example, Adelanto, California was not listed in the proceeding-level master record data file.
269 In order to identify the location of the immigration court, we relied on the EOIR
Immigration Court Listing, supra note 45.
270 See American Factfinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/
jsf/pages/index.xhtml [http://perma.cc/NP9K-P2NL] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); 2010 Census Island
Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/2010census/news/press-kits/island-areas/
island-areas.html [http://perma.cc/Z3AU-ZYPR] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). For San Pedro,
California, 2010 data were not available, so we relied on 2000 Census data instead. San Pedro, L.A.
TIMES, http://maps.latimes.com/neighborhoods/neighborhood/san-pedro/ [http://perma.cc/RZ6WUHZ5] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). For Honolulu, we obtained the 2010 population from data
collected by the United Nations. City Population By Sex, City and City Type, UNDATA,
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3A240 [http://perma.cc/9QHF-5P2G] (last
updated Dec. 22, 2014).
271 Our Small City category combines the United States Census Bureau’s definitions of
“urban cluster,” which is an area with a population of 2500 or greater but less than 50,000, and
“rural place,” which is an area with a population less than 2500. Urban and Rural Classification, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html [http://perma.cc/
9P4Q-3HY7] (last updated July 27, 2015). Using this method, the following base cities were
classified as Small Cities: Bradenton, Fla. (population 49,546); Eloy, Ariz. (population 16,631);
Florence, Ariz. (population 25,536); Hagatna, Guam (population 1051); Imperial, Cal. (population
14,758); Los Fresnos, Tex. (population 5542); Lumpkin, Ga. (population 2741); Napanoch, N.Y.
(population 1174); Oakdale, La. (population 7780); Saipan, N. Mar. I. (population 48,220); and
York, Pa. (population 43,718).
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Cities are those with a population larger than 50,000, but less than
600,000.272 Large Cities are those with population of 600,000 or more.273
Nationality. We coded each case based on respondent nationality. We
then assigned each case to one of six geographic regions: Mexico, Central
America, South America, Caribbean, Asia, and Other.274 Individuals who
were stateless or had no known nationality were excluded from regression
and nationality analyses.
Voluntary Departure. A noncitizen in removal proceedings may apply for
permission to leave the United States “voluntarily” instead of by order of
the immigration judge.275 Voluntary departure is often considered to be a
benefit, as it allows the immigrant to avoid certain harsh consequences of a
272 Our Medium City and Large City categories divide the United States Census Bureau’s
definition of “Urbanized Area” (cities with populations of 50,000 or more) into two subsets. Id. Using
this method, the following base cities were classified as Medium Cities: Adelanto, Cal. (population
31,765); Arlington, Va. (population 207,627); Atlanta, Ga. (population 420,003); Bloomington, Minn.
(population 82,893); Buffalo, N.Y. (population 261,310); Cleveland, Ohio (population 396,815);
Elizabeth, N.J. (population 124,969); Guaynabo, P.R. (population 75,443); Harlingen, Tex.
(population 64,849); Hartford, Conn. (population 124,775); Honolulu, Haw. (population 337,256);
Kansas City, Mo. (population 459,787); Lancaster, Cal. (population 156,633); Las Vegas, Nev.
(population 583,756); Miami, Fla. (population 399,457); New Orleans, La. (population 343,829);
Newark, N.J. (population 277,140); Omaha, Neb. (population 408,958); Orlando, Fla. (population
238,300); San Pedro, Cal. (population 80,065); Tacoma, Wash. (population 198,397); Tucson, Ariz.
(population 520,116); and West Valley, Utah (population 129,480).
273 Using this method, the following base cities were classified as Large Cities: Baltimore, Md.
(population 620,961); Boston, Mass. (population 617,594); Charlotte, N.C. (population 731,424);
Chicago, Ill. (population 2,695,598); Dallas, Tex. (population 1,197,816); Denver, Colo. (population
600,158); Detroit, Mich. (population 713,777); El Paso, Tex. (population 649,121); Houston, Tex.
(population 2,099,451); Los Angeles, Cal. (population 3,792,621); Memphis, Tenn. (population
646,889); New York, N.Y. (population 8,175,133); Philadelphia, Pa. (population 1,526,006); Phoenix,
Ariz. (population 1,445,632); Portland, Or. (population 583,776); San Antonio, Tex. (population
1,327,407); San Diego, Cal. (population 1,307,402); San Francisco, Cal. (population 805,235); and
Seattle, Wash. (population 608,660).
274 Philip Schrag and his coauthors recently adopted a similar technique of relying on world
regions to analyze EOIR data. See Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 780, 792 (2010). In
dividing the world’s countries into six regions, we began with the World Bank methodology of world
regions. See Countries, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country [http://perma.cc/4P6RE5VC] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (categorizing each country into one of six categories: (1) Africa; (2)
East Asia and Pacific; (3) Europe and Central Asia; (4) Latin America and the Caribbean; (5) Middle
East and North Africa; and (6) South Asia). We then made several modifications to fit our data. The
World Bank’s region of “Latin America and the Caribbean” was separated into four regions, as the
majority of removal respondents are from this region. Specifically, we divided this region into Mexico
(n = 574,448), Central America (n = 260,971), South America (n = 67,205), and the Caribbean (n =
85,908). Due to the limited number of respondents in the other regions, we condensed them into two
categories: Asia (n = 96,914, including the World Bank’s categories of East Asia and Pacific, Central
Asia, and South Asia); and Other (n = 119,963, including the World Bank’s categories of Europe,
Africa, Middle East, and North Africa).
275 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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judge-issued removal order, such as bars to lawful readmission. However,
given that respondents granted voluntary departure must leave the country,
this Article does not refer to voluntary departure as a form of relief.
Instead, individuals granted voluntary departure are counted as having been
ordered removed. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which
defines voluntary departure as “a form of removal, not a type of relief.”276
Applications for Relief. We consider an immigrant as having applied for
relief if he or she submitted at least one affirmative application for relief.
The major types of relief pursued by removal respondents during the
six-year time period that we analyzed are: asylum;277 withholding under
convention against torture;278 asylum withholding;279 cancellation of
removal (lawful permanent residents);280 cancellation of removal
(nonpermanent residents);281 adjustment of status;282 section 212(c) relief;283

276
277

2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at Q1.
Asylum is a form of discretionary relief available to individuals who qualify as
“refugee[s]” by demonstrating past “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” I.N.A.
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
278 Under the Department of Justice’s regulations implementing the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, noncitizens in removal
proceedings must not be removed to a particular country if it is “more likely than not” that they
will be tortured there. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(b)(1) (2015).
279 Section 241(b)(3) asylum withholding is a form of relief that must be granted for a
noncitizen found to have a clear probability of persecution in his or her country of origin, based on
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. I.N.A.
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).
280 Section 240A(a) cancellation of removal is a form of relief from removal available to
noncitizens facing removal on criminal grounds (other than based on an aggravated felony) who
have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for at least five years and resided
continuously in the United States for seven years after lawful admission. I.N.A. § 240A(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012).
281 Section 240A(b) cancellation of removal is a form of relief from removal available to
noncitizens without legal status who have been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of ten years and who have not been convicted of various offenses, including
crimes of moral turpitude, drug offenses, or falsification of documents. I.N.A. § 240A(b)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). In order to qualify, the applicant must demonstrate exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to a citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.
I.N.A. § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012).
282 Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal available to noncitizens eligible for
lawful permanent resident status based on a visa petition approved by the Attorney General.
I.N.A. § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012).
283 Section 212(c) relief is a form of immigration relief abrogated by IIRIRA and presently
available only to noncitizens who entered plea agreements prior to April 1, 1997. For those who
still qualify, section 212(c) requires lawful permanent residence for at least seven years and no
conviction for an aggravated felony, unless the plea agreement for the felony was made before
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and section 212(h) waiver.284 Some respondents applied for more than one
form of relief. If the respondent withdrew his or her relief application
before the judge ruled on the merits of the application, we did not count the
respondent as having sought relief.285
Asylum Applicants. For purposes of analyzing patterns in asylum cases in
Table 1 and Figure 20, we coded anyone who had at least one application for
asylum,286 asylum withholding,287 or protection under the Convention
Against Torture288 as having submitted an I-589 application.289 In addition,
because these applications can be submitted together with other forms of
relief requests, we coded the outcome as relief so long as the case outcome
was a grant of relief to remain lawfully in the United States.290
Prosecutorial Charge Type. Every removal case begins with the filing of a
charging document that states the government’s legal basis for removal.291
For our analysis, we divided the charges included in the EOIR database into
four categories. Beginning with the most serious, these categories are:292

November 29, 1990, or, if entered into after this date (but before April 1, 1997), the applicant has
served a term of imprisonment of no more than five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).
284 Section 212(h) relief is a form of discretionary relief that allows the Attorney General to
waive the application of certain grounds of inadmissibility, including crimes of moral turpitude,
prostitution, commercial vice, possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, and two or more
convictions for which a total sentence of five years was imposed. I.N.A. § 212(h)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h)(1) (2012). For additional discussion of section 212(h) waiver eligibility requirements, see
KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., UPDATE ON I.N.A. § 212(h) DEFENSE
STRATEGIES (2011), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/update_on_ina_212_1.pdf [http://perma.
cc/58J3-L5AE].
285 Approximately 5% of the National Sample (n = 59,793) had at least one withdrawn
application. Of these individuals, however, 71% maintained some other form of application for
relief (n = 42,322).
286 For a definition of asylum, see supra note 277.
287 For a definition of withholding of removal, see supra note 279.
288 For a definition of protection under the Convention Against Torture, see supra note 278.
289 A similar methodology of grouping asylum-related applications for analysis was followed
by the Vera Institute. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 39 n.47 (“To avoid mislabeling, we
are reporting on the entire application as opposed to claims relating only to asylum, withholding,
or [Convention Against Torture].”).
290 We note that the EOIR data code cases granted only asylum withholding or Convention
Against Torture as removals, rather than grants of relief. We choose not to alter EOIR’s categorization of
these cases. These forms of relief do not result in a permanent-resident status and continue only as long
as the noncitizen demonstrates eligibility. STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:15 (2014 ed.).
291 In our National Sample, prosecutors used 139 unique charges, although any given case
may contain multiple charges leveled against the respondent.
292 This categorization of prosecutorial charges builds on a similar classification approach
developed by TRAC. See Charges Asserted in Deportation Proceedings in the Immigration Courts: FY
2002-FY 2011, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS C LEARINGHOUSE (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/260/include/detailchg.html [http://perma.cc/2L67-FJ5W] (listing charges
alleged against detainees in immigration proceedings from 2002 through 2011).
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(1) aggravated felony;293 (2) other criminal conduct;294 (3) reentry and entry
without inspection;295 and (4) other civil immigration charge.296 For
respondents with multiple charges, we assigned their case to the most
serious charge type. This method of prioritizing the most serious charge for
categorizing removal statistics follows the prioritization hierarchy adopted
by the United States Department of Homeland Security.297
Stipulated Removals. Stipulated removal orders are based on a written
agreement between the immigrant and DHS rather than the judge’s
independent analysis of the underlying facts.298 If the respondent is not
represented by counsel, the court must hold a hearing to determine if the
noncitizen’s stipulation to removal is “voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.”299 Cases that result in removal under the program are marked
as stipulated removals in the EOIR case identifier database.
In Absentia Removals. Immigration judges have the authority to enter
removal orders against respondents who fail to appear at their hearings.300
To enter a removal order in absentia, the government must present “clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the respondent is removable.301

293 The aggravated felony category includes all charges based on convictions classified as
aggravated felonies under the federal immigration law. I.N.A. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
294 All criminal conduct and convictions not included in the “aggravated felony” category are
included in the “other criminal conduct” category. In addition, a total of 244 cases that included more
severe terrorism or national security charges were included under the aggravated felony category.
295 This category includes all individuals charged as illegally entering under the federal
immigration law, I.N.A. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012), or returning to the
United States after a prior deportation, I.N.A. § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2012).
296 All civil immigration charges not classified as “reentry and entry without inspection” are
included under the “other civil immigration charge” category. Common charges in this category
include presence in violation of the immigration law and lack of a valid immigration visa. See
I.N.A. § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2012) (present in violation of law); I.N.A.
§ 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2012) (lack of valid immigration visa).
297 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE
Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QL44-ABZC] (categorizing noncitizens who pose a danger to national security or a
risk to public safety, especially those convicted of crimes, repeat immigration violators, and recent
border crossers as the first priority for removal); see also FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S.
DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics (click on “Methodology”)
[http://perma.cc/J8VX-ZE7B] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (noting that “[t]o prioritize the removal of
convicted criminal aliens,” ICE relies on the level of severity of the criminal conviction, with the most
serious “Level 1” offenders being those convicted of “aggravated felonies”).
298 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
299 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2015).
300 Id. § 1003.26.
301 Id. § 1003.26(c)(1).
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The master record file in the EOIR database identifies those cases where
removal was entered in absentia.302
Institutional Hearing Program. The Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)
adjudicates the cases of immigrants convicted of deportable offenses while
they are serving their criminal sentence.303 Therefore, IHP cases are not
adjudicated while the respondent is in civil immigration custody, but rather
while the respondent is incarcerated in a federal, state, or county facility.304
For purposes of analysis, IHP cases were identified with a separate data file
containing the IHP designation.
Juvenile Cases. The EOIR data included cases of children as well as adults.305
We classified juvenile cases as those with a case identification entry indicating
either juvenile, unaccompanied juvenile, or NACARA dependent.306
B. National Sample
Preparation of the data for analysis included several steps to create a
six-year sample of removal cases decided by immigration courts
(the “National Sample”).
Proceeding Type. For all tables and figures except for Figure 1, the data
were limited to removal proceedings. Removal proceedings were by far the
most common type of immigration proceeding in the EOIR dataset.307 Of
302 For our National Sample of 1,206,633 removal cases decided from 2007 to 2012, we were
missing information on the in absentia field in only fifty-seven cases, fifty-five of which were
removed. We were able to validate our in absentia findings with those published in EOIR’s
Statistical Yearbook. 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at H1 fig.10.
303 See supra note 100.
304 See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at P1 (describing the IHP as “a cooperative effort
between EOIR; DHS; and various federal, state, and municipal corrections agencies”).
305 For recent research on the increase in migrant children in immigration courts, see OLGA
BYRNE & ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN
THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS, POLICY MAKERS, AND
RESEARCHERS (Mar. 2012), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-ofunaccompanied-children-through-the-immigration-system.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VPS-WRXR]; New
Data on Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Court, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (July 15, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/359 [http://perma.cc/
HX6W-G3XV].
306 The same method was adopted by the Vera Institute, in consultation with EOIR. See
VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 79 (classifying juvenile cases with the following case
identification codes: J; J1; UJ; ND; and U); see also Adjournment Code Memo, supra note 126
(defining EOIR’s case identification codes).
307 The following proceeding types are not considered removal proceedings by EOIR:
credible fear; reasonable fear; claimed status; asylum only; rescission; continued detention review;
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA); exclusion; deportation; and
withholding. See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 13, at C1-C3 (itemizing the different categories of
immigration proceedings).
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the 6,165,128 proceedings in entire dataset, 1,839,628 nonremoval
proceedings were deleted, leaving 4,325,500 removal proceedings.
Merits Decisions. The data were next analyzed to isolate the proceeding in
which the immigration judge reached a decision on the merits. We coded
each case as resulting in one of four possible merits decisions: case
termination; grant of relief; voluntary departure; and removal.308 Like
EOIR, we treated voluntary departure as a form of removal, as it requires
the respondent to leave the United States.309
The first on-the-merits decision in each case was treated as the relevant
judicial decision for analysis of case outcomes.310 To identify the relevant
outcome of each case, a total of 1,264,594 nonmerits proceedings were
deleted, leaving 3,060,906 proceedings. We subsequently chose only the
earliest on-the-merits proceeding based on completion date; in the small
number of cases in which multiple merits proceedings were completed on
the same day, the proceeding with the earliest hearing date (or input date in
the case no hearing date was available) was chosen. Ultimately, we identified
2,929,504 cases for analysis, each with one relevant merits decision.311
Most administrative adjournments of proceedings, such as to change
venue or transfer a case, are not considered merits decisions by EOIR.312 A
very small number of administrative case closures, such as a grant of
temporary protected status, are classified by EOIR as on the merits.313
These closures accounted for less than 1% of judicial merits decisions each
308 See id. at D1 (“In rendering a decision, the immigration judge may order the alien
removed from the United States, grant some form of relief, or terminate the proceedings . . . .”).
Relief can only be granted if the respondent submitted some form of application, but in a small
number of cases removal is ordered despite a successful application for relief. Of the cases in our
National Sample, approximately 5% of respondents who had at least one application for relief
granted were ordered removed (8300 removal orders out of 153,077 total application grants).
Almost all of these cases occurred in the asylum withholding and Convention Against Torture
context. See supra note 290.
309 See supra note 98.
310 This methodology is consistent with other studies of EOIR data. See, e.g., GAO ASYLUM
REPORT, supra note 58, at 65 (explaining that “we limited our analysis data set to only those
proceedings with records that included the first decision on the merits . . . made by an
immigration judge”); VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 86 (“[W]e used the first decision
issued by the immigration judge as the case outcome in this analysis.” (citation omitted)).
311 A similar case-level approach for analyzing immigration adjudication was adopted by the
Vera Institute of Justice in reviewing the Legal Orientation Program. See VERA EVALUATION, supra
note 16, at 81 (distinguishing between proceeding-level and case-level analysis and concluding “it
would be confusing to report on proceedings as opposed to what we defined as ‘cases’”).
312 See, e.g., 2013 YEARBOOK, supra note 74, at D3 (defining proceeding-level completions
classified as “other” as “not decided on their merits”).
313 See, e.g., id. at C4 fig.6 (displaying administrative closure, failure to prosecute, other
administrative completion, and temporary protected status as “other completions”).

2015]

A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court

89

year.314 Because our interest in case outcomes focuses on the relationship
between removal, relief, and attorney representation, we did not treat these
administrative closures as merits decisions. Instead, we looked to the next
proceeding to determine if the judge ordered termination, relief, voluntary
departure, or removal. If the judge did, we treated that merits outcome as
the relevant case outcome.
Fiscal Year. The data were next limited to cases decided in the six-year
period between fiscal years 2007 and 2012. The federal government’s fiscal
year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 of the following year.315
For case-level categorization of fiscal year, the completion date of the
judge’s first merits decision was used.
Final National Sample. A total of 1,201,379 cases decided prior to 2007 (or
after 2012) were deleted,316 leaving a final National Sample of 1,206,633
removal cases decided on their merits between fiscal years 2007 and 2012.
C. Additional Analytical Samples
Some analyses presented in this Article required modifications to the
National Sample. In this Section, we describe the steps taken to create those
additional samples.
Court Continuance Sample. Analyzing court continuances necessarily
relied exclusively on hearing-level schedule type. Approximately 5%
(n = 59,414) of cases in our National Sample did not have this hearing-level
data for one or more of the proceedings completed on or before the merits
proceeding. Such cases were excluded from the National Sample for these
analyses, leaving 1,147,219 removal cases in the Court Continuance Sample.
In Figures 7 and 8 we relied on this sample to analyze case time provided
for continuances to seek counsel, which we measured as the total number of
days from when the continuance was granted to the date when the next
court hearing across the entire case was held.
Regression Analysis Sample. For the regression analyses presented in
Section III.A, we narrowed the National Sample to further increase
consistency across cases. Specifically, we removed prisoner cases decided
under the IHP317 and juvenile cases.318 A total of 28,128 IHP cases and
314
315

Id. at C2 fig.5.
See Fiscal Year, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_
year.htm [http://perma.cc/955S-V82U] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
316 In reporting the number of cases removed based on each variable, we included in the total
those deleted due to lack of data for that particular variable.
317 See supra notes 303–04 and accompanying text. This decision to remove IHP cases from
the analysis of removal proceedings is consistent with that adopted by the Vera Institute in
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subsequently 34,074 juvenile cases were removed, leaving 1,144,431 adult
cases decided in the regular immigration court program.
We added controls for a number of respondent- and case-specific factors.
Using the coding methods already described in this Appendix, we controlled
for the following factors: (1) nationality; (2) prosecutorial charge type; and
(3) geographic region. In addition, we included fixed effects for (1) fiscal
year of decision; and (2) base city of decision. A total of 1589 cases were
missing data for one or more of these predictors used in the regression
analysis. After removing these cases, 1,142,842 removal cases remained in
the Regression Analysis Sample.
Case Duration Sample. For the analysis of case duration presented in Part
III.B, we removed both prisoner cases under IHP as well as juvenile cases to
increase consistency across cases. We then excluded 156,809 cases that
resulted in stipulated removal orders, because these cases by definition do
not involve multiple case hearings.319 A Case Duration Sample of 987,622
cases remained. Figures 16-18 and Tables 6 and 7 are based on this sample.
“Total Case Duration” was measured as the time from the first hearing
in the first proceeding at the beginning of the immigrant’s case (generally
the master calendar hearing) to the date of the last hearing in the
proceeding in which the judge issued the first decision on the merits.320 In
cases where no hearing date was available for one or more proceedings
completed on or before the merits decision (n = 59,414), the input date of
the earliest proceeding and the completion date of the merits proceeding
were used to calculate total case duration.
“Time Seeking Counsel” was measured as the total time between
hearings granted a continuance to seek counsel and the subsequent hearing
adjourned for another reason, starting from the first hearing of the first
proceeding at the beginning of the immigrant’s case (generally the master
calendar hearing) to the date of the last hearing in the proceeding in which
the judge issued the first decision on the merits. Time Seeking Counsel was
calculated among cases with at least one continuance granted to seek counsel.

studying detained immigration adjudication. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 90 (“We
removed cases identified as Institutional Hearing Program cases from our analysis.”).
318 See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text. Other researchers have made a similar
decision to remove juvenile cases in analyzing outcomes across cases. See, e.g., VERA
EVALUATION, supra note 16, at 79 (“We deleted all cases coded with juvenile case IDs.”).
319 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
320 See supra Figure 17. A similar methodology for measuring case processing time was adopted
to study the Department of Justice’s Legal Orientation Program. VERA EVALUATION, supra note 16,
at 16 n.13, 48, 81-82.
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“Percent of Total Case Duration Seeking Counsel” was measured as the
proportion of Time Seeking Counsel to Total Case Duration among cases
with at least one continuance granted to seek counsel.
“Merits Proceeding Duration” was measured as the time from the first
hearing in the merits proceeding (generally a master calendar hearing) to the
date of the last hearing in the merits proceeding.321 In cases where no hearing
date was available (n = 49,749), the input date and the completion date of the
merits proceeding were used to calculate merits proceeding duration.

321

See supra note 206.

